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Essay 1  
Information Production, Investor Perception, and the Types of External Financing 
I.  Introduction 
Every year U.S. companies raise large amount of external capital through the 
capital markets. On average, non-financial U.S. companies raise $86.4 billion through 
long-term non-convertible debt offerings, and $13.5 billion through primary equity 
offerings over the 1984 to 2003 period.1 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) suggest that 
asymmetric and incomplete information play an important role in financial markets. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) remark that information asymmetries are particularly pronounced 
in financial markets. However, it is still an unresolved question whether and how 
information asymmetry affects a firm’s external financing choice. As Klein, O’Brien and 
Petyers (2002) conclude, “there is no definitive empirical support for specific information 
explanations of capital structure and financing decisions.” The primary objective of this 
study is to investigate the impacts of information asymmetry and information production 
on firms’ financing choices. I examine whether equity financing encourages different 
information production than debt financing, and whether the difference in impact on 
information-production between equity financing and debt financing affects firms’ 
financing choices. The results provide new evidence on the relationships between 
information production, information asymmetry and firms’ external financing choices.  
                                                 
1 These numbers are calculated based on information recorded in Security Data Company’s Global New 
Issues Database. 
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 Theoretical research does not provide consensus on the effect that information 
asymmetry has on firms’ financing choices in terms of debt versus equity. On one hand, 
some theories argue that debt should be used when asymmetric information is substantial. 
Myers (1984) and Myers & Majluf (1984) present the pecking-order theory, which argues 
that if firm managers possess more information about assets-in-place than outside 
investors and that they act in the best interests of current shareholders, managers would 
rather use debt instead of equity. Narayanan (1988) also argues that when information 
asymmetry about firm quality is considerable, debt would be preferred to equity because 
debt financing can keep unprofitable firms out of the capital market, thereby improving 
the average quality of firms in the capital market.  
Other theories argue against debt use when significant information asymmetry 
exists. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that when information about project risks is 
asymmetric and all projects have the same expected positive returns, information 
asymmetry about project risks results in credit rationing in the loan market and 
consequently underinvestment. Using the assumptions in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
DeMeza and Webb (1987) show that equity dominates debt as the financing method at 
equilibrium and results in efficient investment. In their model, because all projects have 
the same expected positive returns, they are equally attractive to equity investors. 
Therefore equity financing enables all firms to raise needed funds and undertake all the 
projects with positive net present values. Daniel and Tittman (1995) demonstrate that 
when information on cash flow variances is asymmetric and firms differ only in cash 
flow variance, equity is preferred to debt at equilibrium because equity financing does not 
have an adverse selection problem whereas debt financing does. 
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  The studies just mentioned implicitly assume that information asymmetry is 
exogenous. Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) model firms’ financing choices in terms of equity 
and debt when information asymmetry is endogenous. They assume that firm managers 
have private information about firm quality and choose a security type that is more likely 
to be issued successfully, because a successful security issue enables managers to 
undertake projects and consequently enjoy uncontracTable private benefits. The success 
of the issue depends on whether there is sufficient demand for the new security issued. 
Some outside investors (specialized investors) have access to information-production 
technology and can become informed at some cost. Because equity is more information 
sensitive than debt, the specialized investors can receive greater expected profits from 
information production when equity is issued than when debt is issued. As a result, a firm 
of good quality but facing high levels of information asymmetry can issue equity to 
induce more information production and informed demand, thus enhancing the chance 
that the issue will succeed. Sunder (2003) presents a theoretical model, as well as 
empirical evidence, that suggests firms facing high levels of information asymmetry 
might issue equity to induce information production to make the stock price more 
informative, which consequently reduces the borrowing costs in future. 
Empirical studies that examine the impact of information asymmetry on corporate 
financing choices are limited and have mixed results (Klein and Belt (1994), Helwege 
and Liang (1995), Jung, King, and Stulz (1996)). The mixed evidence might be, to some 
extent, attributed to the information asymmetry variables used and the failure to control 
for the endogeneity of information production.2 For example, firm size, market-to-book 
                                                 
2 Helwege and Liang (1995) use variables such as R&D expenses, venture capital financing, output growth 
in the two-digit industry the issuing firm belongs to, firm age, tangible assets, size, and the number of non-
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 ratio, research and development (R&D) expenditures are used as proxy for information 
asymmetry in some empirical studies. But these variables also measure other 
characteristics that affect the debt/equity decision. Big firms have greater debt capacity 
and tend to use more debt. Firms with higher market-to-book ratio have more growth 
opportunities and consequently might use less debt. R&D expenditures might reflect 
intangible assets. Firms with greater R&D expenditures have more intangibles assets, 
thereby use less debt. Therefore, it is difficult to decide whether the research results 
should be attributed to information asymmetry impact or other factors. This study uses 
the number of financial analysts following firms to measure information production and 
information asymmetry. The more analysts that follow a firm, the more information that 
will be produced and the lower levels of information asymmetry for the firm. I also 
construct an information asymmetry index based on analyst coverage and other variables 
that were used to measure information asymmetry in previous studies. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that financial analysts reduce information 
asymmetry and mitigate managerial non-value maximization behavior. Financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations are extensively distributed and used by 
individuals, businesses, and researchers.3 Merton (1987, p485) remarks that “the 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial equity offerings in each year as proxies for information asymmetry. Klein and Belt (1994) use the 
log of sales level, the number of shareholders of a firm’s stock, or liquidity (the ratio of total shares traded 
over shares outstanding) as proxy for information asymmetry in their Logistic regressions. Although they 
share the same sign as sales, the number of common stock shareholders and liquidity never significantly 
affect the probability of debt issue. Jung, King and Stulz (1996) use total assets to proxy for information 
asymmetry. Sales and total assets might also be indicators of firms’ ability to access the debt market, or the 
size of tangible assets. In such cases, even if the pecking-order theory is correct, the results will be 
inconsistent with it. 
3 Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) report that there are about 3,000 financial analysts (not including junior 
analysts) working for over 300 investment banks or brokerage houses. More than 63 percent of traded firms 
receive analyst coverage. Best and Zhang (1993) document that banks rely on financial analysts’ forecasts 
and recommendations to screen out loan applications and determine their evaluation and monitoring efforts. 
When information from analysts is noisy and signals declining prospects, banks have incentive to 
investigate the borrowers, and consequently such bank loans convey new information. DeGraw (2001) 
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 acquisition of information and its dissemination to other economic units are … central 
activities in all areas of finance, and especially so in capital markets.” Financial analysts’ 
activities are closely related to the production and distribution of information. Brennan 
and Hughes (1991) argue that investors tend to trade only securities that they know about. 
Brennan and Hughes (1991) and Womack (1996) find that analyst coverage expands 
investors’ cognizance of a firm’s securities. A large number of empirical studies have 
adopted analyst coverage and forecast properties as measures of information asymmetry 
(D’Mello and Ferris, 2000), information production (Liu and Qi, 2001), and investor 
optimism (Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis, 2002). However, no studies have investigated the 
effects that analyst coverage and forecast properties have on corporate financing choice 
decisions. Seasoned security issuance is an important event to companies and investors. 
Companies need to raise money from investors to finance their projects. Investors need to 
find good-quality firms to invest. When firms issue either equity or debt, the information 
provided to the SEC is essentially the same. Investors lack expertise in security analysis 
and desire for more information about security-issuing companies and the securities 
issued. I conjecture that analyst coverage should increase after security issue 
announcements due to increase in demand for new information, and the increase in 
analyst coverage should be greater after equity issue announcement than after debt issue 
announcements because equity provides greater potential profits from information 
production than debt. 
This study investigates some areas that have not been examined in previous 
studies, including: (1) whether equity financing encourages more information production 
                                                                                                                                                 
mentions that lack of analyst coverage sometimes is the reason institutional investors avoid investing in 
some stocks. 
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 than debt financing, whether such difference can explain the types of external finanicng, 
and how information asymmetry affects firms’ financing choices when the impact of 
information production on financing choices is controlled for. My investigation provides 
the first empirical evidence on the argument in Fulghiery and Lukin (2001) and Sunder 
(2002) that firms might choose to issue equity rather than debt when information 
production is endogenous, (2) whether analysts’ forecasts change ⎯ that is, become more 
optimistic or pessimistic ⎯ prior to and subsequent to issue announcements, how 
analysts’ optimism toward debt-issuing firms differs from the optimism toward equity-
issuing firms, and whether the post-issue underperformance of security issuers reflects 
investors’ pre-issue overoptimism; (3) whether and how investor optimism affects firms’ 
financing choices. Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that the long-run underperformance 
of equity issuers is evidence of investor overoptimism and managers’ opportunism to take 
advantage of such sentiments. Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) hypothesize that investors’ 
perceptions of a firm are important to corporate managers expecting to issue public debt 
or equity. My investigation thus provides direct evidence on such arguments. 
I use the change in analyst coverage ⎯ the post-issue 12-month mean analyst 
coverage minus the pre-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage ⎯ to proxy for 
information production following security offering announcements. The greater the 
increases in analyst coverage are, the more information is produced. I find that the 
number of analysts following a firm increases significantly by 1.43 after equity offerings, 
but there is only a slight increase of 0.13 after debt offerings. In addition, good-quality 
firms and firms facing high-levels of information asymmetry tend to have greater 
increases in analyst coverage. Using ordinary least square (OLS) and probit model 
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 regressions respectively, I find that equity financing leads to greater  increases in analyst 
coverage, and that increases in analyst coverage raise the probability of equity financing. 
I employ a three-step procedure to control for the endogeneity of information production. 
I first run a probit regression using a set of explanatory variables that is commonly used 
in the literature that relates to firms’ financing choices to get the predicted probability of 
equity offerings versus debt offerings. I then use the predicted probability of equity issues 
along with other variables about firm quality, size, and information asymmetry to explain 
the change in analyst coverage. I find that the predicted probability of equity issue results 
in significant increase in analyst coverage. I then use predicted change in analyst 
coverage to explain the firms’ financing choices. The predicted change in analyst 
coverage is the predicted value of the model that explains the changes in analyst coverage 
in the second step. It measures the expected information production by outside investors 
in anticipation of security offerings. I find that information asymmetry has a negative 
effect on probability of equity issues whereas the expected information production raises 
the probability of equity financing versus debt financing. Moreover, there is also a 
significantly positive effect of the interaction term between information asymmetry and 
information production on probability of equity issues, indicating that the negative impact 
of information asymmetry on equity financing is mitigated by the positive effect of 
expected information production. This study not only provides new evidence that 
information asymmetry reduces the probability of equity financing, but also confirms the 
theoretical argument of Fulghier and Lukin (2001) that when information production is 
endogenous, some firms might issue equity rather than debt. I also examine why firms 
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 desire greater increases in analyst coverage and consequently greater reduction in 
information asymmetry. 
Prior studies have documented long-run underperformance of security offerings 
and that equity issuers have poorer performance than debt issuers (see Loughran and 
Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995, 1998)). I find that the post-issue buy-
and-hold abnormal returns increase with increases in analyst coverage. I also find that 
equity issuers with high analyst coverage increases neither underperform market nor the 
debt issuers. Finally I investigate the change in investor optimism during the 12 months 
surrounding security offers to determine whether differences exist between equity issuers 
and debt issuers.4 The evidence indicates that investors are more optimistic about equity 
issuers than about debt issuers. Investor optimism is strengthened after equity issues but 
is weakened after debt issues. For both equity and debt issues, the post-issue buy and 
hold abnormal returns are negatively associated with the pre-issue investor optimism. 
However investor optimism does not affect firms’ financing choices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews relevant 
literature. Section III presents the hypotheses. Section IV describes the data and 
variables. Section V reports and discusses the empirical results, and finally section VI 
concludes. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
                                                 
4 I use analysts’ forecast errors, long-term growth rate forecasts, the ratio of difference between number of 
analysts making upward revision and number of analysts making downward revision to the total number of 
analyst following, and the investor optimism index to measure investor optimism. Investor optimism index 
is the equal-weighted average of the ranks of the aforementioned variables. The construction of our 
information asymmetry index and investor optimism index follow the method in Butler, Grullon and 
Weston (2004).  
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 Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that if capital markets are perfect, the market 
value of any firm is independent of its capital structure. In reality, the capital markets are 
not perfect due to the existence of taxes, bankruptcy risk, agency problems, asymmetric 
information, and so forth. Consequently, capital structure and financing choices are 
relevant to a firm’s value. In this section, I first review theoretical and empirical studies 
relating information asymmetry to firm’s financing choices in terms of debt versus 
equity, and then I review literature on analyst coverage. 5 Similar to Klein, O’Brien and 
Petyers (2002), throughout this paper information asymmetry refers to the fact that firm 
insiders, especially managers, have more and better information than outside investors on 
the value and risk of their firm’s assets and investment opportunities. 
 
A. Theories on Financing Choice Ignoring Information Production 
Some researchers argue that debt should dominate equity as a means of external 
financing in the presence of asymmetric information about assets-in-place or future cash 
flows. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) assume that firm managers possess 
more information than outside investors and act in the best interests of current 
shareholders. If the firm’s stock is undervalued, managers would rather give up positive 
NPV projects than issue equity to finance the projects, because the benefits to the old 
shareholders from undertaking the projects are less than the dilution costs from issuing 
undervalued equity. If a firm issues equity, outside investors infer that the firm’s stock is 
overvalued and correspondingly discount the stock price. Therefore an equity-issue 
announcement would lead to negative market reaction.  
                                                 
5 The reader can refer to Klein, O’Brien and Petyers (2002) for more complete literature review in this area. 
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 The pecking-order theory argues that firms prefer internal funding to external 
financing. If external financing is required, firms issue the straight debt first, then hybrid 
securities such as convertible debt or preferred stock are issued, whereas equity is only 
issued as the last resort. Narayanan (1988) assumes that information asymmetry exists 
about the mean of the distribution of the cash flows from the firm’s investment 
opportunities, but the variance of the distribution of cash flow is common knowledge. 
The pecking order still applies under such a setting, in that firms will always issue risky 
debt rather than equity because debt financing can keep unprofitable firms out of the 
market, thereby improving the average quality of firms in the market and increasing 
average valuation of firms.  
On the other hand, other theories argue against debt use under information 
asymmetry. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that due to information asymmetry between 
firm insiders and outside investors (banks) about project risks, high interest rates might 
induce firms to undertake riskier projects. As a result, banks do not increase interest rates 
to clear the loan market but rather leave some loan applications unsatisfied (credit 
rationing), hence debt financing results in underinvestment. To the other extreme, 
DeMeza and Webb (1987), Giammarino and Neave (1982) show that when firm 
managers have private information about project risks, issuing equity dominates issuing 
debt at equilibrium, because it does not incur the adverse selection problem, a debt issue 
does. In Giammarino and Neave’s (1982) model, managers issue debt when their projects 
are riskier than investors believe. Investors will expect managers’ opportunistic behavior 
and refuse to buy debt. As a result, at equilibrium the pecking order is reversed: equity 
and convertible securities are preferred to debt. Daniel and Titman (1995) demonstrate 
 10
 that when information asymmetry is about project risks, firms will choose equity rather 
than debt. 
A number of models allowing for asymmetric information argue that capital 
structure or financing choices might act as a signal about firm or project quality. In the 
signaling model of Ross (1977), managers know the true quality of the firm, but investors 
do not. High (low) quality firms have high (low) profitability. Firm managers benefit if 
the firm’s securities are valued high, and they are penalized if the firm goes bankrupt. 
Bankruptcy risk rises as the amount of debt issued by the firm increases. High-quality 
firms issue more debt to signal their good quality, but low-quality firms can not mimic 
the high-quality firms because they do not have enough cash flow to back up the debt. 
Consequently, the leverage level is an unambiguous signal about the quality of a firm, 
and the value of a firm is positively related to its debt-equity ratio. 
Blazenko (1987) investigates the firm’s incentive to use debt to signal firm 
quality. He assumes that firm performance affects managerial compensation and 
reputation. Because leverage increases the total risk of share ownership, firm managers 
have preference of using equity financing. With symmetric information, managers 
exclusively use equity financing. If managers know more than outsiders and are 
sufficiently risk-averse, they will issue debt to signal the high quality of the projects they 
consider.  
Miller and Rock (1985) argue that investors might derive information about a 
firm’s future earnings from managers’ financing decisions. In their model, if a firm uses 
more (less) external financing than expected, outside investors conclude that firms cannot 
generate enough cash flows to meet their capital expenditure needs. As a result, the 
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 market responds negatively when firms announce large amounts of unexpected external 
financing. 
Noe (1988) models a firm’s financing decisions as a sequential signaling game. 
Noe shows that when firm insiders have perfect private information on firm’s future cash 
flows, debt dominates equity as the equilibrium financing method for all firms. However, 
when firm insiders have imperfect private information about the firm’s cash flows, at 
equilibrium, both high- (H) and low-quality (L) firms issue debt, whereas medium-
quality (M) firms issue equity. The market can correctly infer the value of M, but not that 
of H or L. This equilibrium rejects the pecking-order theory because a type M firm 
strictly prefers equity financing to debt financing. 
In addition, Lucas and McDonald (1990) argue that managers with private 
information will time their equity offerings. On one hand, undervalued firms delay 
issuing equity until the undervaluation is corrected. These firms, therefore, have above-
average performance before the issue announcement. On the other hand, overvalued 
firms issue equity immediately upon identifying a new project, because waiting might 
lead to the loss of the project. These firms therefore experience below-average 
performance before equity issue announcement. Lucas and McDonald’s model predicts 
that (1) equity issues on average are preceded by a positive abnormal return on the stock, 
while some issues may be preceded by a loss; (2) equity issues on average are preceded 
by an abnormal rise in the market; (3) stock price drops upon announcement of equity 
issue. 
 
B. Theories on Financing Choice Considering Information Production 
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 The aforementioned models ignore the information production problem and 
implicitly assume that information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is 
exogenous and constant. This is quite unrealistic, because a firm’ disclosure behavior and 
the activities of financial analysts that follow the firm bring new information to the 
market, thereby affecting the extent of information asymmetry between firm insiders and 
outside investors. Boot and Thakor (1993) first show that information sensitive securities 
encourage endogenous information production. Fughieri and Lukin (2001) and Sunder 
(2002) argue that public equity provides a stronger incentive for information production 
than public debt. In the Fulghieri and Lukin model, managers have private information on 
their firms’ quality, which can be either good or bad, while the distribution of firm 
quality is common knowledge. There are two types of investors and a group of 
competitive market makers: Uninformed investors exert an exogenous and inelastic 
demand for firm’s securities, whereas specialized investors have access to costly 
information-production technology, and thus they choose whether to produce the 
information and thereby become informed or not. If specialized investors find that the 
firm is good, they initiate a purchase order on the security the firm issues to the market 
makers; if they find the quality of the firm is poor, they short the securities the firm 
issues.6 The market makers set the price equal to the expected value of the security 
conditional on the observed demand. If the total demand from the informed and 
uninformed investors is not sufficient enough, the perceived quality of the issuing firm 
and, consequently, the issue price will be so low that the firm cannot raise the desired 
funds, which means the issue fails. Firm managers want to maximize the probability of a 
                                                 
6 Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) claim the main results in their paper will hold also when short sales are 
prohibited. 
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 successful issue and the stock values of original shareholders. They choose the security 
type to affect specialized investors’ information-production activities and their 
subsequent informed trading. Given the security issued by the firm, specialized investors 
will choose to become informed so long as they expect to earn profits from information 
acquisition. An increase in the volume of informed trading increases total demand and 
induces a higher issuing price, thereby raising the chance that the issue will succeed. 
Because equity is a junior claim and is more information sensitive than debt, debt does 
not always dominate equity when firms seek external financing. If the cost to acquire the 
information is sufficiently low, issuing equity increases informed trading and thereby 
decreases the minimum level of demand from uninformed investors that is necessary for 
the issue to succeed. Therefore, in this case, firms of good quality prefer to stimulate 
information production to enhance the chance of a successful issue by issuing equity 
rather than debt, whereas poor-quality firms might try to mimic the financing behavior of 
good-quality firms.  
Sunder (2002) presents both theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact that 
information spillovers from public securities have on firms’ capital structures and long-
run financing costs. Sunder argues that firms might bear the full lemon costs of issuing 
equity today to induce information production, which is reflected in stock prices and 
spills over into prices of other tradable securities, leading to reduced information 
asymmetry and financing costs in the future. She finds that borrowing costs of firms 
decrease with measures of information production in stock markets. 
 
C. Empirical Evidence on Firm’s Financing Choices 
 14
 One branch of studies investigates stock market reaction to security offering 
announcements. Asquith and Mullins (1986), Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986), 
Smith (1986)) and others document that on average, both equity and convertible debt 
issues result in significantly negative market reactions.7 However, the evidence on market 
reaction to debt issues is mixed.8 In general, empirical findings support the pecking order 
theory and the signaling models mentioned before (except Rock and Miller (1985)) in 
that market reaction to equity issues is significantly more negative than the reaction to 
debt issues. For example, Smith (1986) reports that the cumulative two-day 
announcement-period abnormal return is –3.15 percent for equity issues, -2.07 percent for 
convertible debt offers, and –0.26 percent for straight debt issues. 
The other branch of empirical studies investigates the determinants of security 
issue choice. Helwege and Liang (1996) track the financing behavior during the1984-
1992 period of firms that went public in 1983. They apply a logit model to predict 
external financing and a multinomial logit model to predict the type of financing. Their 
results show that the probability of raising external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in 
internal funds and that firms do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of 
security to offer. Helwege and Liang include variables such as R&D expenses, venture 
capital financing, output growth in the two-digit industry to which the issuing firm 
belongs, the firm’s age, tangible assets, size, and the number of non-financial equity 
offerings in each year as measures of information asymmetry. They find that information 
                                                 
7 The market reaction to equity issue is more negative than to convertible debt issue. 
8Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Ecobo(1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Shyan-Sunder (1991) find that 
market response to straight debt issue announcements are insignificantly different from zero. Johnson 
(1995) finds significantly positive stock price reactions to debt issue announcements for low-dividend 
payout firms. Manuel, Brooks and Schadler (1993) document significantly negative market reactions to 
debt-issue announcements closely preceding dividend and earnings announcements.  Howton, Howton and 
Perfect (1998) find a significant negative market reaction of –0.387 on the announcement date of straight 
debt issue without conditioning on dividend or earnings announcements. 
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 asymmetry variables increase both the probability of public bond issuance relative to the 
private debt issuance and the probability of equity issuance relative to private debt 
issuance in the same way, which is inconsistent with pecking-order theory. Klein and 
Belt (1994) choose firms with actual sales growth during the 1984-1988 period that 
exceeded a sustainable growth rate computed based on 1983 sales level, and apply the 
contingent table analysis as well as logit analysis. They separately use the natural 
logarithm of sales level, the number of shareholders of a firm’s stock, or liquidity (the 
ratio of total shares traded over shares outstanding) as proxy for information asymmetry.9 
In their logistic regressions of internal financing versus external financing, only sales and 
the number of common stock shareholders are significant. In their regressions of debt 
versus equity, although the three measures of information asymmetry have the same 
positive sign, only sales level significantly increases the probability of a debt issue. A 
possible explanation is that sales level might proxy for the ability to access the debt 
market, or proxy for the value of tangible assets. Also, the number of common stock 
shareholders and liquidity may not proxy for information asymmetry as well as analyst 
coverage.10 Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) apply logistic regressions on a sample of 192 
equity issues and 276 bond issues from 1977 through 1984. They also examine stock 
price reactions to issue announcements, and post-issue corporate actions. They find 
strong support for the agency model, which argues that firm managers pursue their own 
objective (such as growth) at the expense of shareholders. The results show that firms 
                                                 
9They believe that larger values for these variables represent lower levels of information asymmetry. 
10 Since many common stock shareholders do not care about the firms they own, lack access to information 
sources and the expertise to analyze firms’ financial statements, the number of common stock shareholders 
may not be a good proxy for information asymmetry. Information reflected through liquidity may be 
limited. High-liquidity stocks may reflect information more quickly as a result of high analyst coverage on 
these stocks. Financial analysts have comparative advantages in generating and releasing information, as 
well as monitoring firm management. Analyst coverage increase investor cognizance (Brennan and Hughes 
(1991)) and stock liquidity (Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1995), Brennan and Tamarowski (2000). 
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 without valuable investment opportunities have a more negative stock price reaction to 
equity issues than firms with better investment opportunities. The worst stock price 
reactions occur to firms that have characteristics similar to debt-issuers but issue equity to 
finance capital expenditures. Jung et al. (1996) use past cumulative excess return, six-
month leading indicators of economic activities, slack, and total assets to proxy for 
information asymmetry, and find that past cumulative excess return and six-month 
leading indicators of economic activities raise the probability of equity issue, indicating 
firms time equity issue to coincide with periods of low information asymmetry. However, 
the post-issue cumulative excess returns fail to explain the debt-equity choice, which 
rejects the hypothesis that firms time equity issues when stock prices are overvalued. 
Large firms are found to be less likely to issue equity and slack (measured by ratio of 
cash and liquid assets over total assets) does not affect debt-equity choice; both results 
are inconsistent with the pecking-order theory.  
In general, most studies on the determinants of security choice focus on choice 
between debt and equity, and they find that information asymmetry, agency problems, 
bankruptcy costs, and tax considerations affect a firm’s debt-equity issue choice (see 
Baxter and Cragg 1972, Marsh 1982, Titman and Wessels (1988), Makie-Mason (1990), 
Bayless (1994), Jung, King and Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), 
among others). Particularly, factors such as growth opportunities, R&D expenditure, pre-
issue price run-up induce equity issues, and large firms prefer to issuing debt rather than 
equity. However, the evidence is mixed on how information asymmetry affects a firm’s 
security issue choice. No empirical studies have ever investigated whether equity and 
debt have different impacts on information production and such differences, if existing, 
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 affect firms’ financing choices.  This study first jointly examines the effects that 
information asymmetry, information production and their interaction have on firms’ 
financing choices. It also fills the gap by providing direct link between pre-issue investor 
optimism and firms’ financing methods and pre-issue investor optimism and post-issue 
stock market performance. 
 
D. Financial Analysts, Information Production and Information Asymmetry 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that security analysts generate and 
disseminate information about firms they cover and they monitor manager’s agency 
behavior. Merton (1987) presents a model showing that firm values are positively 
associated with the breadth of investor cognizance. He remarks that “The acquisition of 
information and its dissemination to other economic units are, as we all know, central 
activities in all areas of finance, and especially so in capital markets.” There are 
numerous studies supporting that financial analysts play key roles in producing 
information and reducing information asymmetry. Brennan and Hughes (1991), and 
Womack (1996) find evidence supporting the notion that analyst coverage expands 
investors’ cognizance of a firm’s securities. Fried and Givoly (1982), Gordon, Gordon 
and Gould (1989) show that analysts’ earnings forecasts are superior to other earnings 
forecast methods. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Roulstone (2001) report that 
firms with greater analyst coverage have smaller bid-ask spreads and greater liquidity 
than firms with less coverage. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) also find that greater 
analyst coverage tends to reduce adverse selection costs measured by the inverse of 
market depth. Because analysts have access to specialized resources and possess the 
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 knowledge and skills needed to analyze corporate financial data, they have a comparative 
advantage over “typical” investors in monitoring corporate managers and generating 
economically relevant information, which is released to investors through public reports 
and announcements. Consequently, analyst coverage reduces information asymmetry 
between firm insiders and outside investors, and helps improve firm performance. Irvine 
(2003), Branson, Guffey, and Pagach (1998) find that the market responds positively to 
initiation of analyst coverage, indicating that the market expects analyst coverage to 
reduce information asymmetry. Consistent with this hypothesis, D’Mello and Ferris 
(2000) find that equity issue announcement period returns are significantly less negative 
for firms with higher analysts coverage, which also positively (negatively) affects a 
firm’s long-run stock return after issue. Since Bhushan (1989) and Moyler, Chatfield and 
Sisneros (1989), more and more studies use analyst coverage as measures on information 
asymmetry, information production or stock price informativeness. For example, Barth 
and Hutton (2004) find that stock prices for firms with more analyst coverage incorporate 
information on cash flows and accruals more quickly than stock prices for firms with less 
analyst coverage. Liu and Qi (2001) use the analyst coverage as the proxy for information 
production and find that analyst converge explains a significant portion of the cross-
sectional variation in diversification discount during the period 1985-1999.  Liu and Qi 
(2002) present a model predicting that cross-sectionally investment-cash flow sensitivity 
will be stronger for firms with more informative stock prices. They find firms with higher 
analysts coverage have greater investment-cash flow sensitivity than firms with lower 
analyst coverage.  
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 However, there is evidence (Trueman 1994; Welch 2000) suggesting that analysts 
may engage in herding, which casts doubts on analysts’ information production function. 
Some studies find that due to conflicts of interest, financial analysts may generate 
forecasts that are overly optimistic. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) show that analysts 
optimistically respond to information. Other studies like Stickle (1992), Abarbanell 
(1991), Dreman and Berry (1995), and Chopra (1998) also find that analyst forecasts are 
on average optimistically biased. Financial analysts make optimistic forecasts on purpose 
to cultivate management access for private information about the firm and to generate 
underwriting businesses and trading commissions for their brokerage houses. Analysts 
are rewarded for such behavior. For example, Baker (1996) reports that analysts earn 
large bonuses for bringing investment banking clients to their firms.11 Lin and McNichols 
(1998), Michaely and Womack (1999) and Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) document 
that analysts are overoptimistic about a firm’s future prospects around equity issues. 
Therefore, they make overoptimistic long-term growth forecasts about equity-offering 
firms’ earnings. Teoh and Wong (2002) find that the issue-year excess accruals have 
persistent impact on errors in analysts’ annual earnings forecasts after the issue. Analysts 
generally are credulous about the issuers’ total and excess accruals no matter whether 
they are affiliated or unaffiliated. Their results indicate that analysts contribute to investor 
optimism about new issues and thereby question financial analysts’ abilities in reducing 
                                                 
11 In recent years regulation has changed a lot. The Securities and Exchange Commission imposed the 
Regulation Fair Disclosure Rule, which prevents analysts from obtaining information exclusively from 
company insiders. The Sarbarnes-Oxley Act 2002 prohibits research analysts from participating in the 
solicitation of investment-banking business. To protect analyst independence, this act also prohibit firms 
from retaliating against research analyst who publish reports or express public opinions that may adversely 
the firm’s investment-banking business.  See Brown (2005). 
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 information asymmetry.12 More recent studies (see Leone and Wu (2002), Hong and 
Kubik (2003), Jackson (2004) among others) find that analysts’ compensations are tied 
with their forecast precision and reputation, and that analysts’ reputations are positively 
affected by their forecast precision. Therefore due to concerns for their reputations and 
compensations, analysts have incentives to generate precise information.  
In On Wall Street (Mar 1st, 2001), DeGraw writes, “Without analyst coverage, a 
firm with limited recognition has little hope for attaining the investor attention needed for 
full valuation. The absence of any major analyst coverage is a sentence to trading 
obscurity. Lack of analyst coverage sometimes is the reason why institutional investors 
avoid investing in some stocks”. Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) find that seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) firms choose underwriters different from those completing their 
initial public offerings in order to receive better research coverage from analysts, 
indicating that firms care very much about analyst coverage.  
 
E. Objectives 
In addition to the fact that theoretical studies do not agree with impact of 
information asymmetry on firms’ financing methods, empirical studies are limited and 
also do not provide consistent results on the effect that information asymmetry has on 
seasoned financing choices. Even though they are commonly used to measure 
information asymmetry or to proxy for investors’ perception, analyst coverage and 
forecast properties have never been used to examine firms’ incremental financing 
                                                 
12 Hansan and Sarin (1998) examine analysts’ forecast behavior around SEOs. They document and adjust 
the bias that equity issuers are among the high growth IBES firms which typically have much higher 
forecast errors. Their findings suggest that either the short-run or long-run abnormal forecasts observed 
around equity issuance are not unique but is instead a common phenomenon to high growth firms. They 
also find that managerial earnings manipulation does not affect analysts’ earning forecasts.  
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 choices, and no studies have ever examined whether equity financing will induce more 
information production than debt financing, thus raising the likelihood that firms will 
issue equity rather than debt. As a result, my primary objective is to investigate the 
relationship between financing choices and information production, and to provide new 
information-oriented evidence on seasoned corporate financing choices in terms of equity 
versus straight debt. My second objective is to examine some areas that have not been 
investigated in previous studies. For example, whether financial analysts also make 
optimistic earnings forecasts about debt-issuing companies before offerings, and whether 
analysts’ optimism toward equity issuers differs from their optimism towards debt 
issuers. Furthermore, I aim at investigating whether such difference may help explain the 
difference in long-run performance between equity issuers and debt issuers. My 
investigation thereby aims at providing direct evidence on some hypotheses found in 
previous studies. For examples, Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that the long-run 
underperformance of equity issuers is evidence of investor overoptimism and managers’ 
opportunism to take advantage of such sentiments. Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) 
hypothesize that investors’ perceptions of a firm are important to corporate managers 
expecting to issue public debt or equity.  
 
III.  Hypotheses 
Theoretical studies show that information asymmetry should be related to firms’ 
financing choices. Because equity is more severely undervalued than debt when 
substantial information asymmetry exists about assets-in-place or future cash flows, 
Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Narayanan (1988) argue that firms prefer 
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 debt to equity financing when they seek external financing. Blazenko (1987) suggests 
that firm managers might exclusively use equity financing if information is symmetric. 
As information asymmetry intensifies managers will issue debt to signal firms’ high 
quality. These studies imply a negative relationship between probability of equity 
financing and extent of information asymmetry. Alternatively, Giammarino and Neave 
(1982), DeMeza and Webb (1987) show when firms differ in project risks and 
information asymmetry is about project risks, firms might issue equity rather than debt 
because debt financing incurs the adverse selection problem and equity financing does 
not. Debt issued by firms with riskier projects will be overvalued and firms issue debt 
when debt is overvalued. Expecting managerial opportunism of issuing overvalued debt, 
investors might refuse to purchase debt unless debt price is discounted. So at equilibrium 
equity financing dominates debt financing, which suggests that probability of equity 
financing will be positively related to extent of information asymmetry. The information 
asymmetry hypothesis predicts that the information asymmetry should affect firms’ 
financing choices in terms of equity and debt. But the sign is uncertain. Prior studies have 
found mixed evidence on impact of information asymmetry in firm’s financing choices 
without considering the information production problem (Klein and Belt (1994), Helwege 
and Liang (1996), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996)). However, it is not known what the 
impact information asymmetry will have when controlling for endogeneity of information 
production.  
The Information production hypothesis argues that equity issuance induces more 
information production than debt issuance, and such difference in turn raises the 
probability of equity financing over debt financing.  
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 Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) assume that there are specialized outside investors 
who can generate information on a firm’s quality. Equity issues provide greater expected 
profits from information acquisition than debt issues because equity is a junior claim and 
is more information-sensitive than debt. As a result, equity issue announcements should 
encourage more information production than debt issue announcements. Managers of 
high-quality firms might issue equity rather than debt to raise the probability that the 
issue will succeed. Similarly, because public equity provides greater incentive to 
information production than public debt, Sunder (2002) argues that firms might choose to 
issue equity and assume the adverse selection cost today, expecting that more information 
will be produced, and therefore information asymmetry and financing costs will be 
reduced in the future. Seasoned public security issuance is a very important event in a 
company’s history. So the demand for information should increase around security issue 
announcements. Naturally such events might attract more financial analysts to produce 
more information. I use change in analyst coverage — post-issue analyst coverage minus 
pre-issue analyst coverage — to proxy for the information production induced by security 
offerings. The greater the increase in analyst coverage after a security offering, the more 
information is produced. Because private information is more valuable when information 
asymmetry is high, firms with high levels of information asymmetry might attract more 
analysts. That is, information asymmetry and information production interact with each 
other. Consequently, the impact of information asymmetry or information production on 
financing choices might also depend on the interaction term between information 
production and information asymmetry. As a result, I also include such an interaction 
term to explain firms’ equity/debt choices in the probit model regression. 
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IV.  Data Selection and Variable Descriptions 
A. Data Selection 
Firms that issued straight debt or primary equity are selected from the Security 
Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global Financing Database for the period from January 1984 
to December 2002. Convertible debt offerings, debt rollovers and debt offerings with 
maturity less than 1 year are excluded from the sample. Initial public equity offerings, 
preferred stock offerings, combined equity issues, secondary equity issues, rights 
offerings, unit offerings, withdrawn issues are also excluded. The initial sample includes 
3,074 seasoned primary equity offerings and 12,289 straight debt offerings by U.S. 
companies. The final sample is formed using the following restrictions: 
1 There are no security offerings before and during the one year period 
subsequent to the current issue. 
2 12 month pre-issue daily stock return data is available from The Center of 
Research for Stock Prices (CRSP) using TSPRINT.  
3 The number of analysts following the issuers (analyst coverage) must be 
available for the 12-month period before security offering and the 12-month period after 
the security offering from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) U.S. 
Summary History database. 
4 Firms issuing primary equity and straight debt in the same year are 
excluded. Duplicate issues on the same day are excluded. 
5 Firms in financial industry (SIC 6000-6999) and utility industry (SIC 4900-
4949) are excluded. 
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 6 Accounting information on the fiscal year end before security offerings 
must be available from COMPUSTAT. 
The final sample includes 1,831 straight debt offerings and 1,375 primary equity 
offerings over 1984 to 2002 period.  
Insert Table 1 here  
 
B. Variable Descriptions and Methodology 
To measure the information asymmetry of security issuers, I use the reciprocal of 
analyst coverage, and the information asymmetry index. Unlike analyst coverage, which 
is inversely related to extent of information asymmetry, the reciprocal of analyst 
coverage and information asymmetry index directly reflects the extent of information 
asymmetry, thereby makes it more convenient to report and compare results on 
information asymmetry.13 The information asymmetry index is the weighted average of 
the ranks of variables that have been used as information asymmetry proxies in prior 
empirical studies, including analyst coverage (ANN), log of total assets (LNTA), trading 
volume turnover (TURNOVER), market-to-book ratio (MBKR), research and 
development expenditures to total assets ratio (XRDTA), and the standard deviation of 
the residual returns (RESIDSD).14 That is: 
( )ikK
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11  
The information asymmetry index ranges from 0 to 1. The greater the information 
asymmetry index, the greater the information asymmetry an issuer faces. Because ANN, 
                                                 
13 I also use the natural logarithm of 1 plus analyst coverage following prior literature, and the results are 
qualitatively the same.  
14 The standard deviation of residual returns estimated by regressing a firm’s daily returns on value-
weighted market index returns from 255 days before offering date until 46 days before the offering date. 
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 LNTA and TURNOVER are inversely associated with the extent of information 
asymmetry, their negative values are used when constructing the information asymmetry 
index. The information asymmetry index is constructed in a similar fashion as the 
liquidity index constructed in Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004).  
Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) and Sunder (2002) argue that when information 
production is endogenous firms might issue equity to encourage information production, 
which consequently reduces information asymmetry. For that reason, the change in 
analyst coverage is measured as the difference between the mean analyst coverage during 
the 12-month period before security offerings and the mean analyst coverage during the 
12-month period after security offerings. I hypothesize that equity issues will lead to 
greater increases in analyst coverage than debt issues, and this in turn raises the 
probability of equity issues. 
A typical way to control for endogeneity of a variable is using a two-stage 
procedure. Following Pagan (1984), a two-step model is set as: 
eXzy ++= βδ*                                                                                          (1) 
ηα +=Wz                                                                                                             (2) 
 In the first stage, z is regressed against a matrix of instruments, W, to get the 
predicted value of z, . In the second stage, y is regressed on  and an independent 
variable matrix X. The two-step procedure has been widely used in empirical studies. 
Titman, Hovakimian, and Opler (2001) apply the two-step procedure to test whether 
firms make debt/equity choice to move toward their target leverage ratios or not. 
zˆ zˆ
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 Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2004) use the two-step procedure to examine whether 
analysts’ behavior influenced banks’ underwriting business.15
Chaplinsky and Bayless (1991), Bayless (1994), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) and 
among others show that investors can predict the type of security offerings, and the 
predicted probability of security offerings affect market reactions to security issue 
announcements. I conjecture that outside investors can anticipate the type of external 
financing a firm will make, and different anticipated financing types have different 
impact on information production, consequently, such difference will affect firms’ 
financing choices. I use a three-step procedure to control for the predictability of security 
offerings and endogeneity of information production, because a change in analyst 
coverage might result from anticipation of the types of security to be issued. I first 
determine the probability of equity issues compared to debt issues using a probit model 
regression with the set of commonly used independent variables related to equity/debt 
choice. I then use the predicted probability of equity issues together with firm quality, 
size, and information asymmetry measures in an OLS model to explain the changes in 
analyst coverage. The predicted values (change in analyst coverage) and the residuals of 
the OLS model in the second step are used in the probit model to explain the equity/debt 
financing choice in the third step. The predicted change in analyst coverage proxies for 
the expected information production due to security offerings. The residual change in 
analyst coverage is the observed change in analyst coverage not explained by the 
financing choices decisions and firm quality and information asymmetry measures.  
                                                 
15  For econometric issues involved in two-step procedure, besides Pagan (1984), the reader may refer to 
Murphy and Topel (2002), Davidson, R. and J. G. MacKinnon (1993), and Greene (2000). 
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 I also use the typical two-stage procedure in the literature to control for the 
endogeneity of information production, ignoring the predictability of security offerings. I 
first use the following OLS model to explain change in analyst coverage respectively for 
debt and equity offerings.  
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNANNCH 6543210 ααααααα ++++++=  
Then I use the predicted values of the above model to explain firms’ financing 
choices. 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) find that analysts tend to make optimistic 
forecasts before seasoned equity offerings, and the optimism is displayed in analysts’ 
long-term EPS growth rate forecasts. Assuming that financial analysts’ opinions 
represent those of investors, investors’ optimism can be measured by analyst forecast 
errors (FE), the IBES revision ratio (REVR), and the long-term EPS forecast growth rate 
(LGTH). The greater the forecast errors, revision ratios and/or long-term EPS forecast 
growth rates, the stronger investors’ optimism is toward security issuers. Analysts’ 
forecasts errors are calculated as the difference between analysts’ consensus annual mean 
EPS forecasts ( itwF ) and the actual annual EPS (Ait) scaled by the absolute value of 
consensus mean EPS forecast ( itwititw FAFFE /)( −= ). Following Gibson, Safieddine, 
and Sonti (2003), the IBES revision ratio is calculated as the difference between the 
number of analysts making upward forecast revisions (#UPREV) and the number of 
analysts making downward forecast revisions (#DNREV) divided by the total number of 
analysts following the firm (#ANN). That is, 
. Where i represents firm i, t stands for 
fiscal year t, and w denotes the month in which earnings forecasts are reported. Similar to 
( ) )/(### itwitwitwitw ANNDNREVUPREVREVR −=
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 the construction of information asymmetry index, I construct the investor optimism index 
(OPTIM), which is an equal-weighted average of the ranks of analysts’ forecast error, the 
long-term growth forecast rat, and the IBES revision ratio. 
( )ikK
k
ki ZRankKN
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.  
A probit model is used to investigate the impact of information production, 
information asymmetry, and investor optimism on a firm’s financing choice. Control 
variables are adopted according to previous studies, which find that information 
asymmetry, agency problems, bankruptcy costs, and tax considerations affect a firm’s 
debt-equity issue choice (see Baxter and Cragg 1972, Marsh 1982, Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Makie-Mason (1990), Bayless (1994), Jung, King and Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman (2001), among others). Particularly, factors such as growth 
opportunities, R&D expenditure, pre-issue stock price run-up and stock market liquidity 
positively affect probability of equity issues compared with debt issues, whereas firm 
size, return on assets and tax payments are inversely associated with equity financing. 
Table 2 describes the variables used and reports the summary statistics for the sample of 
firms with complete information from SDC, IBES, CRSP and COMPUSTAT. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
V.  Empirical Results and Discussions 
A. Univariate Test Results 
As discussed previously, financial analysts play important roles in information 
generation and dissemination (Womack (1996), Branson, Guffey, and Pagach (1998), 
Barth and Hutton (2004). among others). The greater the number of analysts that follow a 
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 firm, the more information is produced and the lower the level of information asymmetry 
the firm faces. Security offerings are major events in corporate history. Firms offer new 
securities for different purposes. Some firms raise capital to undertake profitable 
investment opportunities, whereas some other firms issue securities to get money for 
“empire building” even though they do not have good projects to undertake. In the 
presence of information asymmetry, it is difficult for ordinary outside investors to 
distinguish the quality of different securities. As a result, the demand for information 
becomes stronger when new securities are offered. Financial analysts are experts in 
analyzing securities. Given the increase in demand for information on new securities, 
there should be an increase in analyst coverage after security offerings. Because equity is 
a junior and residual claim, it is more information sensitive than debts. Given the extent 
of information asymmetry, equity has greater gap between the market value and 
fundamental value than debt does. As a result, the potential payoffs of information 
production should be greater in the case of equity issues. Therefore, I expect to see 
greater increases in analyst coverage after equity issues than after straight debt issues. 
And this is shown in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 compares the average monthly number of analysts following equity 
issues with the average number of analysts following straight debt issuers from 36 
months before the security-offering month until 36 months after the security-offering 
month. I use the change in analyst coverage to proxy for information production induced 
by security offerings. The change in analyst coverage is defined as the 12-month average 
analyst coverage after security offerings month minus the 12-month average analyst 
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 coverage before security offerings month. Table 3 compares the change in analyst 
coverage between debt-issuing and equity-issuing firms within different firm-quality 
quartiles.16 I first divide sample firms into quartiles based on measures of firm quality. 
Firms within each quality quartile are further divided into debt group and equity group. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results by classifying the whole sample firms into quartiles 
based on pre-issue abnormal cumulative returns (ABCUMRET). For every ABCUMRET 
quartile, analyst coverage increases significantly more after equity issues than after debt 
issues. This supports the hypothesis that equity issues encourage more information 
production than debt issues. Furthermore, a change in analyst coverage tends to increase 
as the pre-issue abnormal return rises, indicating that information production is greater in 
the case of good-quality firms. This tendency is more obvious among equity-issuers than 
among debt-issuers. For example, in the lowest ABCUMRET quartile, analyst coverage 
slightly decreases after debt issues, whereas it increases by 0.7 after equity issues. And in 
the highest ABCUMRET quartile, analyst coverage increases by 0.6 after debt issues, 
which still is significantly much smaller than the 1.7 increases after equity issues. Panels 
B and C report results by classifying the sample into quartiles based on market-to-book 
ratio and return on assets, respectively. The results are similar to the results shown in 
Panel A, which suggest that equity issues encourage more information production than 
debt issues and information production tend to increase as firm quality improves. The 
latter conclusion is confirmed by results reported in Appendix A using different sample 
classifications. Sample firms are classified into debt and equity group first, and then firms 
in each financing group are further divided into quartiles based on firm quality measures. 
                                                 
16 There are eight groups after the division. Such classification displays significant changes in firm quality 
and allows enough sample firms in each group to compare the mean difference. 
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Insert Table 3 here 
Prior studies find that firms facing high levels of information asymmetry are 
valued less and have higher costs of raising capital than firms with low levels of 
information asymmetry (D’Mello and Ferris 2000, Bowen, Chen and Cheng 2004, among 
others). Consequently, firms have incentives to reduce the extent of information 
asymmetry they face. To examine whether a) security issue announcements encourage 
more information generation among firms suffering from higher levels of information 
asymmetry than firms with lower information asymmetry, and b) equity issues also 
encourage more information production than debt issues, I classify firms into quartiles 
respectively according to the reciprocal of pre-issue 12-month average analyst coverage 
and the information asymmetry index. Panel A of Table 4 presents results using the 
inverse analyst coverage as a measure of information asymmetry. For debt-issuing firms, 
the change in analyst coverage increases significantly from –0.37 in quartile 1 to 0.94 in 
quartile 4. For equity-issuing firms, change in analyst coverage increases significantly 
from 0.71 in quartile 1 to 1.56 in quartile 4. These results indicate that information 
production increases as the extent of information asymmetry rises. Furthermore, in every 
quartile, the increases in analyst coverage after equity issues are significantly much more 
than the increases after debt issues, which supports the hypothesis that equity issues 
encourage more information asymmetry than debt issues. Panel B reports similar results 
when information asymmetry is measured by the information asymmetry index, show 
that equity financing encourages more information production than debt financing and 
information production tends to increases as information asymmetry intensifies. The 
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 latter conclusion is confirmed by results reported in Appendix B, which classifies the 
whole sample into debt and equity group first, and then firms in each financing group are 
further divided into quartiles based on information asymmetry measures. 
Insert Table 4 here 
Table 5 shows and compares the change in analyst coverage among eight groups 
classified by sorting on median values of firm quality measures (return on assets and pre-
issue cumulative abnormal returns), median values of information asymmetry measures 
(inverse analyst coverage and information asymmetry index) and type of financing (debt 
versus equity).17 These results suggest that better quality firms that face higher levels of 
information asymmetry might encourage greater amount of information production, and 
equity issues induce more information production than debt issues.  
Insert Table 5 here 
 
B. Multiple Regression Results 
 Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of OLS regressions where the dependent 
variable is change in analyst coverage. EDDUM is the financing type indicator. EDDUM 
equals one if equity is issued and zero if debt is issued instead. Consistent with the 
univariate test results, all the coefficients of EDDUM are significantly positive at the 1 
percent level, indicating that equity financing is related to a greater increase in 
information production than debt financing. The coefficient of EDDUM is 0.779, 
indicating that without controlling for anticipation of security issue type and holding 
other factors constant, equity financing raises analyst coverage by 0.779 more than debt 
                                                 
17 Such classification again is in order to show variations in the variable of interest across groups and obtain 
enough sample firms in each group for the statistic test. 
 34
 financing. Firm quality measures such as market-to-book ratio, return on assets, and pre-
issue abnormal cumulative return all positively affect the change in analyst coverage. 
These results suggest that good-quality firms encourage more information production, 
which is also consistent with the univariate test results. Because Model 1 appears to be 
the best fit, I use it in subsequent analysis to explain change in analyst coverage.  
 In the next step of my analysis I assume that firm managers have perfect foresight 
about the impact that a security offering has on analyst coverage. I use the change in 
analyst coverage to explain a firm’s financing choice.18 Panel B of Table 6 reports the 
probit model regression results. The change in analyst coverage increases the probability 
of equity issues, and the effect is significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that the 
greater information production associated with equity issues compared to debt issues 
increases the likelihood that equity financing will be used rather than debt financing. The 
significant negative impact of the inverse analyst coverage on probability of issuing 
equity suggests that probability of equity offering is reduced by the extent of information 
asymmetry. However, the coefficients of information asymmetry index are positively 
insignificant. 
 Insert Table 6 here 
 The assumption that mangers have perfect foresights as to the changes in analysts’ 
coverage that result from security offerings is quite unrealistic. As a result, I use a three-
step procedure to control for the endogeneity of information production and firms’ 
financing choices. First, I use Model 1 in panel B of Table 6 to get EHAT, the predicted 
                                                 
18 In similar fashion, Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) assume firm managers have perfect foresight on the post-
issue stock market performance and use post-issue abnormal return to test the market timing hypothesis. 
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 probability of equity issues versus straight debt issues.19 Second, I use the predicted 
probability obtained in the first-step, along with measures of firm quality, size, and 
information asymmetry to explain changes in analyst coverage, and to obtain the 
predicted change in analyst coverage (PCHANN) and the residual change in analyst 
coverage (RCHANN). 20  Third, I use the predicted change in analyst coverage and the 
residual change in analyst coverage estimated in Step 2, to explain firms’ financing 
choices considering the set of control variables used in step 1. 
In panel A of Table 7 the coefficient of EHAT is 1.82, which is significant at the 1 
percent level. The result suggests that expectations that equity will be issued induce more 
information production than expectations that debt will be issued. The predicted change 
in analyst coverage is the predicted value of the OLS regression in Panel A of Table 7. It 
reflects the expected information production in anticipation of the type of securities to be 
issued.  The residual change in analyst coverage is the residual of the OLS regression in 
Panel A of Table 7. The residual change in analyst coverage is the change in analyst 
coverage that is not explained by the predicted probability of equity issues and measures 
of firm quality and information asymmetry. It might proxy the real impact on information 
production that security offerings may have. The average predicted (residual) change in 
analyst coverage for 1,831 debt issues is 0.211 (–0.081), which is significantly lower than 
the level of 1.326 (0.108) for 1,375 equity issues. This difference is significant at the 1 
percent level.  
                                                 
19 I also use Model 2 in panel B of Table 6 to get the predicted probability of equity issues versus debt 
issues, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
20 The construction of residual change in analyst coverage is inspired by the construction of residual analyst 
coverage in Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). 
 36
 Panel B of Table 7 reports the results using the predicted change in analyst 
coverage as a proxy of information production. The results suggest that information 
asymmetry might reduce the probability of equity offerings, which support the pecking-
order theory. However, the positive impact of an expected equity issue on information 
production also increases the likelihood of equity offerings over debt offerings. In Model 
1 through Model 4 the coefficients of PCHANN exceed 0.22 and are significant at the 1 
percent level. Even though the coefficient of PCHANN in Model 5 is –0.2156, it is non-
significant. And the coefficient of the interaction term between ASYIND and PCHANN is 
1.2225 and is significant at 1 percent level, suggesting that information production still 
has positive impact on the probability of equity issues over debt issues. The evidence 
indicates that the negative effect that information asymmetry has on probability of equity 
issues is mitigated by the anticipated information production. Model 4 in panel B of 
Table 7 ignores the interaction effect of information production and information 
asymmetry on financing choices. In this case the information asymmetry index has an 
insignificantly negative coefficient. After introducing the interaction term, the coefficient 
of information asymmetry index becomes significantly negative. Panel C of Table 7 
shows the results using the residual change of analyst coverage as a measure of 
information production. The results are quite similar to those reported in Panel B. 
 Insert Table 7 here 
 The results using the two-stage procedure to control for the endogeneity of 
information production are reported in Appendix C. They are similar to the results using 
the three-step procedure, indicating that equity financing has greater impact on 
information production than debt financing, which thereby increases the likelihood of 
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 equity financing over debt financing. Information asymmetry reduces the probability of 
equity financing, but its impact is mitigated by information production. 
 
C.  Information Production and Post-issue Stock Performance  
I have shown that raw analyst coverage increases much more after equity issue 
announcements than after debt issue announcements, and such a difference increases the 
likelihood of equity financing. I argue that such evidence supports my information 
production hypothesis that equity issues induce more information production than debt 
issues. Due to this effect some firms may choose to issue equity rather than debt to 
encourage information production and thereby reduce information asymmetry. If 
information production leads to a reduction information asymmetry, on would expect that 
firm valuation improves and that this effect is more significant among equity issuers than 
among debt issuers, because equity is more information sensitive than debt. Table 8 
compares the 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns between debt 
issuers and equity issuers within different quartiles of change in analyst coverage. The 
buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as: 
( ) ( ) 100*]11[
22
∏∏
==
+−+=
ττ
t
Mt
t
jtjt RRabcumretny  
 Where n=1, 2 or 3, τ=252 if n=1, τ=504 if n=2, and τ=756 if n=3. Rjt is firm j’s 
daily return since the second day of security offerings. RMt is the market’s daily return, 
which is measured by the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index return. Prior 
studies document long-run stock return underperformance of equity issuers (Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves 1995, Loughran and Ritter 1995, and among others), straight debt issuers 
(Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1999) and equity issuers have even worse post-issue stock 
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 market performance than debt issuers. Panel A, B and C of Table 8 respectively compare 
the post-issue one-year, two-year and three year buy-and-hold abnormal returns between 
equity issues and debt issues and between different analyst coverage change quartiles. 
The whole sample firms are first divided into quartiles based on change in analyst 
coverage. Then firms in each analyst coverage quartile are further classified as debt or 
equity group. The results indicate that post-issue stock market performance tends to 
improve as change in analyst coverage increases for both debt issuers and equity 
issuers.21 Equity issuers with the highest increase in analyst coverage even beat the 
market by nearly 13 percent for the first year after issuance. For issuers with the highest 
increase in analyst coverage, equity issuers do not significantly underperform the market 
nor underperform debt issuers. For example, within the highest change in analyst 
coverage quartile, the two-year average abnormal return for equity issues is –9.93 
percent, in contrast to -1.58 percent for debt issues. Both are insignificantly different 
from zero, meaning both equity issuers and debt issuers do not underperform the market. 
And the difference between debt issues and equity issues is insignificant. Panel D reports 
the multiple regression results of post-issue buy-and-hold 1-year, 2-year and 3-year 
abnormal returns on change in analyst coverage respectively for debt issues and equity 
issues. The coefficients of change in analyst coverage for equity issues all exceed 3.5 and 
are significant at 5 percent, indicating that holding other factors constant, one additional 
increase in analyst coverage after equity issues would increase the post-issue abnormal 
return by more than 3.5 percent. The coefficients of change in analyst coverage are also 
all positive for debt issues, but they are smaller in magnitude than those for equity issues. 
                                                 
21 Appendix D reports similar results using different sample classifications. Sample firms are first divided 
into equity and debt groups. Firms within each financing group are further divided into quartiles based on 
change in analyst coverage. 
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  Insert Table 8 here 
 
D.  Robustness Tests  
D.1. Constructing and Using an Ex-ante Measure of Information Production 
 The predicted change in analyst coverage used in the probit regression of Table 7, 
Panel A uses the whole sample firms and is based on the change in analyst coverage. 
Since the change in analyst coverage is defined as the 12-month post issue average 
analyst coverage minus the 12-month pre-issue average analyst coverage, it is an ex-post 
measure. In testing the impact of information production on firms’ financing choices, an 
ex-ante measure would be more appropriate. To get an ex-ante measure of information 
production, I first divide the whole 3,206 security offerings firms randomly into two 
groups with the same sample size: the base group and the test group. The base group 
contains 907 straight debt issues and 696 primary equity issues. The test group includes 
924 straight debt offerings and 679 equity offerings. I then run the following probit 
model on the base group and test group respectively to get the predicted probability of 
equity issues versus straight debt issues respectively for the two groups. 22
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Panel A of Table 9 shows the probit regression results. These results are similar to 
each other and are also similar to Model 1 probit regression in Panel B of Table 7. The 
results show that the probability of equity offerings are positively associated with market-
to-book ratio, R&D expenditures, pre-issue abnormal returns, stock market turnover as 
                                                 
22 I divide the whole sample randomly into two equal-sized group: base group and testgroup. I use 
parameter estimates on change in analyst coverage based on base group to predict change in analyst 
coverage for the test group, which is then used to explain the types of security offerings for the test group. 
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 well as standard deviation of residual returns. In contrast, the probability of equity issues 
is negatively related to firm size, tax payments, return on assets. These results are 
consistent with previous findings (see Titman and Wessles (1988), Junk, Kim and Stulz 
(1996), and among others). Next I regress the change in analyst coverage on the predicted 
probability of equity issues versus debt issues and other control variables for the base 
group as the following equation shows: 
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNEHATANNCH 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
 
The OLS regression results for base group are reported in Panel B of Table 9. 
These results are also similar to results reported in Panel A of Table 7. The coefficient of 
EHAT is significantly positive at the1 percent level, indicating that information 
production is positively related to expect equity issues. I then multiply the coefficients 
estimated using the base group by the corresponding values of the independent variables 
of the test group. The product is the predicted change in analyst coverage in the test 
group, which is an ex-ante measure of information production anticipated before security 
offerings for firms in the test group, because it is constructed based on information before 
security offerings. Eventually I use this ex-ante measure on expected information 
production to explain the financing choices for the test group. The results are reported in 
panel C of Table 8. The results are very similar to the results based on the whole sample 
firms, indicating that expected information production raises the probability of equity 
offerings. However, although information asymmetry reduces the probability of equity 
offerings versus debt offerings, and the negative impact of information asymmetry on 
equity issues is mitigated by the positive impact of expected information production.  
Insert Table 9 here 
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D.2. Investor Optimism, Post-issue stock performance, and Firms’ Financing Choices 
Previous studies (Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) and Teoh and Wong (2002)) find that analysts are 
overoptimistic about a firm’s future prospects around equity issues. Therefore, they make 
overoptimistic long-term growth forecasts about equity-offering firms’ earnings, and 
analysts’ optimism may be one reason that SEO firms under-perform the market after 
issue. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), among others 
document poor long-term stock price performance of equity issuers. Loughran and Ritter, 
in particular, argue that the long-run underperformance of equity issuers is evidence of 
investor overoptimism and managers’ opportunism to take advantage of such sentiments. 
McLaughlin, Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1998), and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) 
document substantial long-run post-issue underperformance following bond issues. Healy 
and Palepu (1993, 1995) hypothesize that investors’ perceptions of a firm are important 
to corporate managers expecting to issue public debt or equity. It is therefore imperative 
to examine whether my prior results are reflecting analyst/investor optimism. In the next 
set of tests I analyze whether my results are robust after controlling for analyst optimism. 
Insert Table 10  
Panel A of Table 10 compares analysts’ forecast errors (FE), analysts’ long-term 
growth forecast rates (LGTH), IBES revision ratio (REVR) and investor optimism 
(OPTIM), as well as changes in these variables between equity issues and debt issues. 
Investor optimism index (OPTIM) is an equal-weighted average of the rank of forecast 
error, long-term growth forecast rates and IBES revision ratio. OPTIM ranges from 0 to 
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 1. The greater the optimism index is, the more optimistic investors are toward security 
issuers. Before security offerings, equity issuers have significantly higher EPS growth 
forecast rates and higher IBES revision ratio than debt issuers have. Analyst forecast 
errors for debt issuers are insignificantly greater than those for equity issuers. The 
investor optimism index for equity issuers is 0.5704, which is significantly greater than 
the investor optimism index of 0.4558 for debt issuers. After security offerings, analyst 
forecast errors are increased for equity issuers but are reduced for debt issuers, and the 
differences in analyst forecast errors between equity issuers and debt issuers remain 
insignificant after security offerings. The post-issue long-term growth forecast for equity 
issuers increases a little whereas it decreases a little for debt issuers. For both types of 
issuers, the forecast revision ratios are significantly reduced after the security offerings. 
However, the investor optimism index for equity issuers increases from 0.5704 before 
offerings to 0.5912 after security offerings. In contrast, for debt issuers the investor 
optimism index decreases from 0.4588 to 0.4460. The changes in investor optimism for 
equity and debt issuers are both significant at the1 percent level. The results indicate that 
while overall investors are more optimistic about equity issuers than about debt issuers, 
investors become less optimistic after debt offerings but become more optimistic after 
equity offerings.  
 Panel B of Table 10 reports the OLS regression results of post-issue buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns on pre-issue investor optimism index and other control variables. All 
the coefficients of the investor optimism index are significantly negative and have 
absolute values greater than 20. The results indicate that holding other factors constant, 
for every one unit increase (0.01) in pre-issue investor optimism index, the post-issue 
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 abnormal return would decrease by at least 0.20 percent. The evidence confirms 
arguments in Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) that the post-issue underperformance of security issuers may be 
attributed to the pre-issue investor optimism. Most importantly, consistent with my 
results in panel D of Table 9, the change in analyst coverage still increases the post-issue 
abnormal return significantly after controlling for the effect of investor optimism. 
Holding other factors constant, every additional analyst will enable equity issuers to 
outperform the market by at least 3 percent. Moreover, pre-issue analyst coverage is also 
positively associated with the post-issue abnormal return. 
 Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that firm managers may take advantage of 
investors’ overoptimism on equity issuer. As a result, the pre-issue investor optimism 
index should raise the likelihood of equity issues over debt issues. Panel C of Table 10 
shows the probit regression results using the pre-issue investor optimism to explain firms’ 
financing choices. However, all the coefficients of investor optimism are insignificantly 
negative, rejecting the conjecture that firm managers take advantage of investors’ 
overoptimism on equity issuers to issue equity. Consistent with my prior results, the 
predicted information production still increase the probability of equity issues and 
information asymmetry reduces the likelihood of equity issues, but its impact is mitigated 
by expected information production.  
 In addition to the above robustness tests, I do the same analyses using the 6-month 
average analyst coverage instead of the 12-month analyst coverage, or the relative change 
in analyst coverage ⎯ the difference between post-issue average analyst coverage and 
pre-issue average divided by the pre-issue average analyst coverage, and controlling for 
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 the impacts that IPO and underwriter switching may have on analyst coverage (see Rajan, 
and Servaes (1997), Krigman and Womack (2001)). The results are qualitatively very 
similar, indicating that equity financing encourages more information production than 
debt financing and the greater impact on information production of equity financing in 
turn raises the probability of equity financing over debt financing.  
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
 Most studies on firms’ financing choices assume that information asymmetry is 
exogenous and constant (see Myers and Majluf (1984), Blazenko (1987), Narayanan 
(1988) and among others), thereby conclude that firms would prefer debt financing to 
equity financing when information asymmetry exists between firm insiders and outsiders. 
Fulghiery and Lukin (2001) argue that because equity is more information sensitive than 
debt, issuing equity might provide greater payoffs to outside specialized investors’ 
information production activities. As a result, good-quality firms that face severe 
information asymmetry might issue equity rather than debt to induce information 
production, thereby increasing the demand for their equity and raising the probability that 
the issue will be successful. Sunder (2002) argues that firms that face high levels of 
information asymmetry might choose to issue equity first to encourage information 
production and increase the informativeness of stock prices, expecting that in the future 
the information contained in stock prices will spill over into prices of other traded 
securities. As a result, firms’ future borrowing costs will decrease with increases in 
information production in the stock market. 
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  In this study, I use changes in analyst coverage to proxy for information 
production induced by security issue announcements, and the inverse of analyst coverage 
and an information asymmetry index to measure information asymmetry. I investigate 
whether equity issue announcements encourage more information production than debt 
issue announcements, and the impacts that information production, information 
asymmetry and investor optimism have on firms’ financing choices. I find that during the 
12-month period after security offerings, firms having better quality and facing higher 
levels of information asymmetry tend to have greater increases in analyst coverage 
relative to the pre-issue 12-month period. Furthermore, the increases are more significant 
among equity issues than among debt issues. I also find that firms that exhibit greater 
increases in analyst coverage are more likely to issue equity. The latter results are robust 
when I control for the endogeneity of information production. By using the alternative 
measures on information asymmetry and controlling for endogeneity of information 
production, I provide evidence that information asymmetry reduces the probability of 
equity issues, which confirms the pecking order theory. The impact of information 
asymmetry also depends on its interaction with expected information production and is 
reduced consequently. My results provide the first empirical evidence on the argument in 
Fulghiery and Lukin (2001) and Sunder (2002) that some firms facing information 
asymmetry may choose to issue equity rather than debt when information production is 
endogenous. In addition, I find that firms within the greatest increase in analyst coverage 
(thereby the greatest reduction in information asymmetry) beat the market within one 
year after offerings, and they do not significantly underperform the market three years 
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 after the offerings. Further, within this group of firms, equity issuers do not significantly 
underperform debt issuers.  
I also examine how investor optimism varies surrounding security offerings and 
whether the previous results remain robust controlling for investor optimism. Investor 
optimism is measured by the analyst forecast error, the long-term earnings growth 
forecast rate, the forecast revision ratio and investor optimism index. I find that investors 
become less (more) optimistic after debt (equity) offerings and investors are more 
optimistic about equity issuers than about debt issuers both before and after security 
offerings. Additionally, I present direct evidence that the post-issue long-run 
underperformance of security offerings can be attributed to pre-issue investor optimism 
to some extent. However, pre-issue investor optimism fails to explain firms’ financing 
choices.  
If analyst coverage improves firm valuation, one would observe that the offer 
price of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) should be positively related to analyst 
coverage. Theories provide no consensus on the effect of divergence of opinion on 
security prices (Miller (1977), and Varian (1985)). No empirical studies investigate what 
determine the offering price in SEOs. It will be interesting to examine whether and how 
analyst coverage and analysts’ forecast properties affect the offering prices. 
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Essay 2 
A Unified Analysis on Financing Choices and Offering Costs 
I.  Introduction 
Previous studies have found that stock market prices drop significantly from two 
to three percent when firms announce a seasoned equity issue (see Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Masulis (1986), Smith (1986), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) and among others), 
but the event study evidence is mixed on stock market reaction to debt issue 
announcements (Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Johnson (1995), Manuel, Brooks and 
Schadler (1993), Howton, Howton and Perfect (1998) and among others).23 Nevertheless, 
it is a stylized fact that the market’s reaction to equity issue is more negative than to debt-
issue announcements. For example, Smith (1986) reports that the announcement day 
stock market reaction to equity issuance is about 2.88 percent more negative than the 
reaction to debt issuance. Bayless (1994) finds that the issue costs for equity would be 
35.4 to 48.6 percent greater than those for a similar debt issue using the Asquith-Mullin 
(1986) measure.24 Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996) report that the total direct costs 
of seasoned equity issues amount to 7.11 percent of total proceeds on average, whereas 
the total direct costs of debt issues represent 2.24 percent of total proceeds. These 
                                                 
23 Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Ecobo(1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Shyan-Sunder (1991) find that 
market response to straight debt issue announcements are insignificantly different from zero. Johnson 
(1995) finds significantly positive stock price reactions to debt issue announcements for low-dividend 
payout firms. Manuel, Brooks and Schadler (1993) document significantly negative market reactions to 
debt-issue announcements closely preceding dividend and earnings announcements.  Howton, Howton and 
Perfect (1998) find a significant negative market reaction of –0.387 on the announcement date of straight 
debt issue without conditioning on dividend or earnings announcements. 
24 Asquith and Mullins (1986) present a measure on how much the market value of a security-issuing firm 
is lost for every dollar obtained through security offerings. The Asquith-Mullin measure equals the product 
of market value of equity and the two-day cumulative abnormal return divided by the gross proceeds.  
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 empirical findings show that in general equity financing is much more costly than debt 
financing. It is puzzling that firms still use equity financing even though equity financing 
costs are much more than debt financing. The primary goal of this study is to examine 
whether firms choose a security type that minimizes their total offering costs under the 
presence of factors that may affect firms’ financing choices and offering costs such as 
access to capital markets, information asymmetry, firm and issue characteristics. Total 
offering costs are measured as a percentage of total proceeds raised. It is equal to the 
direct offering costs plus the indirect offering costs. Direct offering costs are the sum of 
investment banking fees, accounting, legal and other expenses as a percentage of total 
proceeds raised. Indirect offering costs are equal to the product of minus cumulative 
abnormal return and firm value on the day before security issue announcement divided by 
the total proceeds raised. If the market reacts positively to a firm’s security issue 
announcement, firm value will increase, which is equivalent to reduction in the offerings 
costs.  
Smith (1986) states,“Maximizing behavior by firms implies that in voluntary 
transactions such as security sales, the firm should structure the transaction to yield the 
highest possible value of the firm” (page 6). Because security issues are voluntary actions 
at the discretion of firm managers, they are subject to self-selection bias. As a result, the 
observed sample of firms that have chosen one type of financing over the other are not 
random, consequently the OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent, because the 
expected mean value of the error term is no longer zero.25 This study adopts Heckman’s 
                                                 
25 Past studies in finance have found that self-selection exists when: (1) IPO companies choose whether to 
include warrants in their offerings or not (Dunbar, 1995), (2) when firms choose their issuance procedure 
(Smith 1987), (3) when IPO firms choose their contract format (Francis et al. 1999). For example, Dunbar 
(1995) controls for the self-selection bias and finds that underpricing and total offering costs are reduced 
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 (1979) two-step procedure in order to jointly investigate the debt-equity choice and 
offerings costs. This framework allows estimation of what the offering costs would have 
been if the alternative security had been issued and thereby enables an examination of 
whether firms choose a less costly financing method. Another goal of this study is to shed 
new light on the determinants of both the market reaction and the costs of raising external 
capital.26 A number of studies have examined the determinants of the (cumulative) 
abnormal returns on (around) the announcement date (period) but have produced mixed 
findings cross-sectionally (Dierkens (1991), D’Mello and Ferris (2000), Jung, King and 
Stulz (1996), among others). In addition, the empirical findings are limited to the 
determinants of offering costs.   
This study uses seasoned security offerings by U.S. publicly-listed firms from 
1984 to 2002 in order to investigate: 1) whether self-selection exists in firms’ security 
offering decisions, and, 2) whether issuing firms choose the security type that minimizes 
their offering costs.27 This paper first controls the selection bias in security offerings and 
considers both direct and indirect offering costs together, aiming at explaining the puzzle 
⎯ why firms issue equity even though equity offering costs are much higher than debt 
issuing costs. The study shows that the reason is that equity issuers would have not been 
                                                                                                                                                 
for firms including warrants as underwriter compensation, thus resolving the puzzle documented in (Barry, 
Muscarella, and Vetsuypens (1991) who report that warrants are commonly used even though the total 
costs including warrants as underwriter compensation in IPOs are higher than the costs without warrants. 
26 Following Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao (1996), total direct costs are measured as the sum of gross 
spreads (investment banking fees) and other direct expenses (registration fee, and printing, legal and 
auditing costs) as percentage of total proceeds. Lee et al. report that the total direct costs for SEOs average 
7.11 percent (ranging from 3.15 to 13.28 depending on proceeds, gross spread averages 5.44 percent of 
total proceeds raised); the total direct costs for straight debt issues average 2.24 percent (ranging from 1.32 
to 4.39 percent, gross spread averages 1.62 percent of total proceeds). Dunbar (1995) examines 
determinants of total direct costs among IPO firms. The empirical studies on determinants of total direct 
costs of seasoned security offerings, especially for straight debt issues are quite limited. 
27 Since some firms issue equity only because they don’t have access to debt market, to avoid such bias, I 
following Denis and Mihov (2003), in assuming that a publicly-listed firm will have accesses to debt 
market if the issuer’s book value of total assets exceeds $100 million, or the minimum issue size exceeds 
$50 million, and use these criteria to screen out firms without access to debt market.  
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 able to save offering costs if they had offered debt. In addition, this study throws new 
light on the determinants of offering costs. Finally, the study adds new evidence to the 
literature on market reaction to straight debt issues. I find that self-selection bias exists 
when firms choose the external financing method. On average, the market reaction to 
straight debt issues is insignificantly positive. If debt-issuers had issued equity instead, 
the direct offering costs would have increased by 2.45 percent and the market reaction 
would have become negative. Indirect offerings costs would have increased by 9.711 
percent and the total offering costs would have risen by 12.65 percent. In contrast, the 
market reaction to equity issues is significantly negative. If equity-issuers had offered 
straight debt, the direct offering costs would have decreased by 3.37 percent and the 
market reaction would have become less negative. However, indirect offering costs 
would have gone up by 3.58 percent, and there would have been no significant decrease 
both economically and statistically in total offerings costs if equity issuers had offered 
straight debt. The results indicate that both straight debt issuers and equity issuers choose 
a security type that costs less. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related 
literature. Section III describes data construction. Section IV presents the methodology 
and hypotheses. Section V reports and discusses empirical results. Finally section VI 
concludes. 
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 II.  Literature Review 
A. Theories on Market Reaction to Security Issue Announcements 
In the signaling model of Ross (1977), managers know the true quality of a firm, 
while investors do not. High (low) quality firms have high (low) profitability. Firm 
managers benefit if the firm’s securities are valued more and are penalized if the firm 
goes bankrupt. Bankruptcy risk rises as the amount of debt issued by the firm increases. 
In equilibrium, high quality firms issue more debt to signal their good quality, while low-
quality firms cannot mimic high-quality firms because low-quality firms do not have 
enough cash flow to back their debt. Consequently, the market reacts positively 
(negatively) to leverage increasing (decreasing) security issue announcements. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that managers with superior information issue 
equity only when their firm’s stock is overvalued, otherwise they would rather give up a 
positive NPV project. The market reacts negatively to equity issue announcements, but 
less negatively to debt issue announcements. Cooney and Kalay (1993) extend Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) analysis by allowing for existence of negative NPV projects and 
information asymmetry on growth opportunities in addition to information asymmetry on 
assets-in-place. They conclude that not all equity issues convey bad news about firm 
value as firms with highly positive NPV projects might still issue undervalued equity to 
avoid giving up the projects. Thereby market reaction to equity issue can be positive if 
investors anticipate that the issuing firm is considering a net present value project. 
In the Miller and Rock’ (1985) model, changes in outside financing are a signal to 
investors of opposite changes in firm’s current earnings.  The market reacts negatively to 
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 large unexpected security issue announcements since investors infer that the security-
issuing firm cannot generate enough earnings to finance its planned investments. 
 
B. Empirical Findings on Market Reactions to Security Issue Announcements 
In general, empirical findings of studies examining market reactions to security 
issue announcements are consistent with the pecking-order model and the signaling 
models (e.g., Ross (1977)), in that the market is found to react more negatively to equity 
issues than to debt issues. Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis (1986), Smith (1986), 
Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), among others, document a significantly negative market 
response to equity issue announcements. However, the findings on the market’s reaction 
to debt issue announcements are mixed. Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Ecobo(1986) and, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find that market responses to straight debt issue 
announcements are insignificantly different from zero. Johnson (1995) finds significantly 
positive stock price reactions to debt issue announcements for low-dividend payout firms. 
Manuel, Brooks and Schadler (1993) document significantly negative market reactions to 
debt-issue announcements closely preceding dividend and earnings announcements.  
Howton, Howton and Perfect (1998) find a significant negative market reaction of –0.387 
percent on the announcement date of straight debt issues without conditioning on 
dividend or earnings announcements. Overall market reaction to equity issues is more 
negative than to debt-issue announcements. For example, Smith (1986) reports that the 
announcement day stock market reaction to equity issuance news is about 2.88 percent 
more negative than the reaction to debt issuance. Bayless (1994) controls for the 
predictability of security type and finds that the reaction to a first-time seasoned equity 
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 issue is more than 4.15 percent more negative than the reaction to debt issue. He adjusts 
the pre-issue market value and gross proceeds using the Asquith-Mullin (1986) measure 
and finds that the issuing costs for equity issue are 35.4 to 48.6 percent greater than those 
for a similar debt issue for his hypothesized “average” firm with a market equity value of 
$943.26 million and issue size of $80.54 million. However, Bayless (1994) considers the 
indirect offerings costs only, and does not control for the selection bias and estimate what 
the indirect offering costs would have been if the same firm had issued the alternative 
security type.  
A number of studies apply multiple regression analyses to investigate the 
determinants of stock market responses to equity or debt issue announcement and 
produce mixed results. Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that the two-day announcement 
period return is negatively (positively) associated with the cumulative stock (market) 
return over the 60 days prior to the offering announcement date for a sample of 301 
seasoned equity issues of industrial firms. However, all the other independent variables 
such as proportional change in outstanding shares of common stock, offering induced 
leverage change, and stock return variance over the 60 days preceding the offering 
announcement lack explanatory power. Dierkens (1991) finds the market-adjusted 
abnormal return at the equity issue announcements is negatively related to measures of 
information asymmetry such as the residual standard deviation of daily stock returns and 
the number of pre-issue announcements listed in the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI). 
The relative number of shares to be issued has no impact on the abnormal return, whereas 
the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity has a significantly positive 
effect. Similar to Dierkens (1991), D’Mello and Ferris (2000) find that the three-day 
 54
 announcement-period returns of SEO firms are related to measures of information 
asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders. Specifically, it is positively (negatively) 
related to analyst coverage (analyst forecast dispersion). However, variables such as the 
11-month pre-issue excess return, the fraction of shares issued relative to the number of 
shares outstanding, the firm size, the market-to-book ratio, as well as the hot period 
dummy have no impact on the announcement period returns of SEO firms. Jung, King 
and Stulz (1996) show that firms with the most valuable investment opportunities 
(reflected by market-to-book ratio, the ratio of firm market value to total assets) do not 
experience adverse stock returns when they issue equity. However, firms, which issue 
equity against their type, register an extremely significant drop in their stock price when 
they issue.28 Besides cash flow to asset ratio, they find that market to-book ratio is the 
only variable that significantly affects the two-day cumulative abnormal return on equity 
issuers; other variables such as stock return volatility, past cumulative excess return, 
cash, tax payments, long-term debt to total assets ratios, total assets, leading indicators, 
post-issue cumulative return, proceeds to market value of common stock, as well as log 
of proceeds all have no impact. Jung, King and Stulz (1996) also run similar regressions 
for debt-issuers, and find that the only variable that is significant is the ratio of proceeds 
to pre-issue market value of common stock. Howton et al. (1998) find that the 
standardized abnormal returns on the announcement date of straight debt issues is 
negatively related to firm’s cash flow to book value of total assets, and positively related 
to the ratio of firm’s total debt to market value of assets, and there is no impact of the 
ratio of gross proceeds from debt issue divided by market value of assets. Mikkelson and 
                                                 
28 Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) consider an equity-issuing company as against its type if the company is 
estimated to have greater probability to issue debt than to issue equity. 
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 Partch (1986) find that the type of security issued is the only determinant of the price 
response. Offerings characteristics such as the net amount of new financing, relative size, 
and the quality rating of debt issues have no impact on the stock market response. These 
studies do not control for the selection bias.  
Some studies control for the impact that investors’ anticipation of a security issue 
type has on the cumulative abnormal returns upon security issue announcements. Bayless 
and Chaplinsky (1991) investigate how the market reactions to debt or equity offers are 
influenced by investors’ expectation as to the type of security to be issued. They 
document a significantly positive 1 percent announcement day return for debt issues 
undertaken by firms that are expected to issue equity. In contrast, the market reacts 
negatively to equity issue announcements of firms that are expected to issue debt. For 
both the equity and debt issues, the two-day cumulative abnormal returns are negatively 
correlated with the probability of issue as perceived by investors before the offering 
announcements. However, they find that issue size has no impact on market reactions. 
Bayless (1994) finds a more significant effect of security type on the two-day cumulative 
abnormal return after controlling for the predictability of security type, as relative to not 
controlling for the predictability of the issue type.  
 
C. Literature on Self-selection Bias 
Heckman (1979) discusses the bias that results from using non-randomly selected 
samples to estimate behavioral relationships, such as migration, manpower training or 
unionism. He developed the two-stage estimator that enables analysts to utilize simple 
regression methods to estimate behavioral functions by least square methods.  
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 Maddala (1991) presents an in-depth review and discussion on the methodology 
of models involving qualitative and limited-dependent variables, including the self-
selection model. Lee (1978) applies the self-selection model to explain relationship 
between wage rates and unionism. The self-selection model has been applied in several 
finance studies. Smith (1987) investigates the choice of issuance procedure and the cost 
of competitive underwriting and negotiated underwriting. He shows that failure to correct 
for a selectivity bias in the choice of issuance procedure in studies prior to his partly leads 
to findings that firms choose the negotiated issuance procedure over the competitive one 
despite its apparently higher net interest cost. After controlling for the selectivity bias, 
Smith (1987) finds that firms in fact choose the issuance procedure that minimizes the net 
interest cost, and therefore, their choices are consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization hypothesis. Using models to correct for self-selection bias, Dunbar (1995) 
and Ng and Smith (1996) investigate the use of warrants to compensate underwriters in 
IPO firms and SEO firms respectively. Their results suggest that issuers choose 
compensation contracts to minimize the total offering costs, in contrast to findings 
ignoring selection-bias prior to theirs, which show that warrant use increased the issuers’ 
offering costs. Fang (2004) examines the relationship between investment bank 
reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting service. He finds that after 
controlling for the selection bias, more repuTable banks actually enjoy a “reputation 
premium”, not a “reputation discount”, which was found in previous studies without 
controlling for the selection bias. 
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 III.  Data Construction 
U.S. firms offering straight debt or primary equity for the period from January 
1984 to December 2002 are selected from the Security Data Company (SDC) global new 
issues database. Specifically, the final sample is formed using the following restrictions: 
1 Debt offerings must mature more than one year after issue, while 
convertible debt offerings and debt rollovers are excluded.  
2 Initial public offerings (IPOs), preferred stock offerings, combined issues of 
debt and equity, rights offerings, best-efforts offerings, secondary issues, unit offerings, 
and REIT issues are excluded. 
3 Firms issuing primary equities and straight debts in the same year are 
excluded. Duplicate issues on the same day are excluded. 
4 (-255, -31) pre-issue daily stock return data are available from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
5 Firms in the financial (sic 6000-6999) and utility industry (sic 4900-4999) 
are excluded. 
6 Accounting data at fiscal year end prior to security issue announcements are 
available from research insight.  
7 The number of analysts following the issuers (analyst coverage) must be 
available for the 12-month period before security offering and the 12-month period after 
the security offering from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) U.S. 
Summary History database.  
8 Firms with proceeds raised below $50 million are excluded.29
                                                 
29 Following Denis and Mihov (2003), firms with issue size below $50 Millions are assumed to have no 
access to debt market. 
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 9 Firms with indirect offering costs in the top (bottom) two percentiles are 
excluded.30
The final sample includes 1,012 primary seasoned equity issues and 1,533 straight 
debt issues. Table 11 reports the sample distribution over 1984-2002 period. 
Insert Table 11 here 
 
IV.  Model Building, Hypotheses and Variable Descriptions 
Smith (1986) remarks, “Maximizing behavior by firms implies that in voluntary 
transactions such as security sales, the firm should structure the transaction to yield the 
highest possible value of the firm” (page 6). This study provides a test of two alternative 
hypotheses. The managerial agency hypothesis predicts that managers choose a security 
issue that benefits themselves, but is at the expenses of shareholders. The cost 
minimization hypothesis, oppositely, predicts that managers choose the security issue that 
minimizes the offering costs.  
 
A. Model Building 
The following model is built in similar fashion to Lee (1978) and Fang (2004). 
 
iii XED εγ +′=*         (1) 
Where EDi* is a latent variable about the financing choice, which is unobservable. 
Suppose equity is issued if EDi* >0, and straight debt is issued if EDi*  0. We can only 
observe whether a firm issues equity or straight debt. Let ED=1 if equity is issued and 
≤
                                                 
30 The indirect costs for firms in these percentiles are quite unreasonable. 
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 ED=0 if straight debt is issued instead. Then EDi = 1 if EDi* >0 and EDi = 0 if EDi* ≤  0. 
The offering costs are the function of a vector of independent variables as the following: 
eiieei ZC µβ +′=         (2) 
diiddi ZC µβ +′=         (3) 
Where Cei is the offering costs when firm i issues equity, Cdi is the offering costs 
if the same firm i issues straight debt instead. The offering costs are measured by direct 
costs, indirect costs as well as total offering costs. Direct offering costs are the sum of 
investment banking fees, accounting, legal, printing and miscellaneous fees as percentage 
of principal amount raised).31 Following Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Bayless (1994), 
I compute the indirect offering costs as the impact of the market reaction on firm value 
relative to the issue size. It measures how much the market value of the firm is lost for 
every dollar obtained through the security issue, thereby is a better measure of the 
indirect cost of security issue and is comparable with direct offering costs since they all 
denoted as percentage of gross proceeds raised ( ( )
i
ii
dei PROCEEDS
CARMVEINDCP −= */, ). Where 
INDCi,e, INDCi,d are indirect cost of firm i’s equity issue or debt issue announcement. 
MVEi is firm i’s market value of equity the day before issue announcement, CARi is the 
cumulative abnormal return during the announcement period, and PROCEEDSi is the 
gross proceeds from the issue. For firms with positive (negative) cumulative abnormal 
returns, firm value increases (decrease) upon security issue announcement, which reduces 
(increases) the offering costs. That is why I use -CARi in calculating indirect offering 
costs. The total offering costs are calculated as direct offering costs plus indirect offering 
                                                 
31 Because SDC does not report values on accounting, legal, printing and other expenses for many sample 
firms, I assume these values are zero if they are missing. 
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 costs. For each issuer we only observe either Cei or Cdi , depending on the value of EDi . If 
there is correlation between iε , eiµ and diµ , then the expected values of the error terms 
will no longer be zero. The expected value of the error term for equity issuers and debt-
issuers are respectively as the following: 
[ ] [ ] [ ( )( ) ] [ ( )( ) ]iieiieiiieiiei X
X
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I assume that the errors (εi, µei, µdi) have a trivariate normal distribution with 
mean vector zero and covariance matrix as: 
                                                        1        σe1                 σd1  
                 COV (ε, µe, µd) =                     σe                  σed 
                                                                                                                 σd
Var( iε ) = 1 because EDi is observed only as a dichotomous indicator. We cannot 
estimate σed, the covariance between eiµ and diµ , because we do not observe Cei and Cdi 
simultaneously for the same firm at a point of time. ( )zφ  and ( )zΦ  are the density 
function and cumulative distribution function respectively of the standard normal 
distribution. [ ( )( ) ]i
i
X
X
γ
γφ
′Φ
′
 is the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) for firms issuing equity. For 
firms issuing straight debt, The IMR is ( )( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
′Φ−
′−
i
i
X
X
γ
γφ
1
. The OLS estimates from 
equation (2), (3) are inconsistent because they miss an important term, the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR). Consistent estimates on parameters in (2) and (3) are obtained through 
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 Heckman (1979) two-stage method: First, equation (1) is estimated by a probit regression 
to obtain the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) terms. Second, the IMRs are added into equations 
(2) and (3) to get equations (4) and (5). After running OLS on equations (4) and (5) 
respectively, consistent estimates on the determinants of offering costs are obtained.  
( )
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Where ηe, ηd are the selectivity bias adjusted residual errors, E[ηe | EDi = 1] = 0, 
and E[ηd | EDi = 0] = 0.  
The offering costs are estimated as the following if the alternative security type 
had been issued. For example, if an equity-issuer had issued straight debt instead, the 
offering costs of the debt issue would have been: 
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B. Hypotheses 
I test two hypotheses: 
Offering costs minimization hypothesis: firms choose to issue a security that 
minimizes the offering costs, which is to their shareholders’ best interests.  
 62
 If this hypothesis is true, then for equity (debt) –issuing firms, the offering costs 
would have been higher if they had issued the alternative security type.  
Alternatively, the Managerial agency hypothesis argues that firm managers 
choose to issue a security type to maximize their own benefits, even this increases the 
offering costs. 
On the one hand, managers might be unwilling to issue new debt, because issuing 
new debt raises the total risk of share ownership (Blazenko (1987)), increases bankruptcy 
risk and consequential dismissal of managers (Zwiebel (1996)), or reduces resources 
under management control (Jensen (1986)). Zwiebel (1996) shows that managers’ target 
leverage level is lower than the optimal leverage level that maximizes a firm’s value. On 
the other hand managers might be unwilling to issue equity because equity issuance will 
dilute managerial ownership of the firms; or because issuing equity will reduce earnings-
per-share. The latter might result in lower managerial compensation, because managerial 
compensation is often positively related to earnings per share (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 
(2002), among others). Thus, agency reason may also explain why managers may choose 
to issue a particular security even though such action would incur greater offerings costs. 
 
C. Variable Descriptions 
I use the inverse of average analyst coverage over the 12-month period before 
security offerings to measure information asymmetry, and construct the predicted change 
in analyst coverage to measure expected information production in anticipation of 
security offerings. The inverse analyst coverage, predicted change of analyst coverage, 
and the interaction term between these two variables are used to explain firms’ financing 
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 choices. Following previous studies Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), Opler and Tittman 
(2002) and among others, I also include other independent variables to explain the 
financing choice in equation (1) where the dependent variable equals one if equity is 
issued and equals zero otherwise: 
PCHANN ⎯ the predicted change in analyst coverage, a measure on expected 
information production induced by security offerings. The construction of PCHANN is 
described in Appendix E. PCHANN is the predicted value of the following OLS model: 
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNEHATANNCH 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
 
Where EHAT is the predicted value of the following probit model: 
)
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Equity financing may induce more information production than debt financing, 
which in turn raise the probability of equity financing.  
INVANN ⎯ the inverse of the pre-issue 12-month average analyst coverage. A 
measure on information asymmetry. Firms facing higher levels of information asymmetry 
may be less likely to issue equity. 
PCHANN*INVANN ⎯ the product of PCHANN and INVANN. The negative 
impact of information asymmetry on probability of equity financing may be mitigated by 
the expected information production. 
LNTA ⎯ the logarithm of book value of total assets. Large firms will be less 
likely to issue equity. 
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 FIXTA ⎯ the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to book value of total 
assets. Firms with greater fixed asset ratio have more collateral to borrow and thereby 
may issue more debt. Alternatively, such firms face lower levels of information 
asymmetry and will therefore use more equity. 
LTDTA ⎯ the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. The higher the long-term 
debt ratio, the higher the bankruptcy risks, therefore the greater probability to issue 
equity. 
TXTTA ⎯ the ratio of tax payments to total assets. The more tax payments, the 
better the debt’s tax shield function and the smaller the probability to issue equity. 
CFLTA ⎯ the ratio of cash flow to total assets. Jensen (1986) shows that leverage 
reduces resources at mangers’ discretion. Managers in firms with greater cash flows may 
issue debt to show their willingness to be subject to monitoring from their creditors, or 
they are unwilling to do so but issue equity to have more resources under their disposal. 
So the sign of CFLTA on probability of equity issue is uncertain. 
XRDTA ⎯ the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. XRDTA may reflect a firm’s 
intangible assets or growth opportunities. It is expected to enhance the chance of equity 
financing. 
MBKR ⎯ the market-to-book ratio, defined as (market value of equity + book 
value of debt)/book value of total assets. Firms with higher market to book ratio may 
have more growth opportunities, therefore may be more likely to issue equity. 
ROA ⎯ return on assets, firms have higher ROA are more profitable and have 
higher debt capacity, thus lower probability to issue equity. 
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 ABCUMRET ⎯ the difference between a firm’s cumulative daily returns and the 
market’s cumulative returns over (-255, -46) period. The market return is CRSP value-
weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDOQ index return. Firms with better pre-issue stock market 
performance are more likely to be overvalued and thus more likely to issue equity. 
BETA ⎯ the coefficient of market returns by regressing firms’ daily stock returns 
on market returns over (-255, -46) period.  
RESIDSD ⎯ the standard deviation of the residual returns from the market 
model, which regresses firms’ daily stock returns on market returns over (-255, -46) 
period.  
TURNOVER ⎯ the average ratio of total trading volume to shares outstanding 
over [-252, -1] period.  
The determinants on offering costs and cumulative abnormal returns are adopted 
according to previous studies such as Dunbar (1995), Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004), 
D’Mello and Ferris (2000) and among others, many of them are described above, so I do 
not specify any more.  
 
V.  Empirical Results and Discussions 
A. Summary Statistics and Characteristics Comparison 
 
            Table 12 compares the offering costs and firm characteristics between straight 
debt issues and common equity issues. It shows that debt issues have much lower 
offering costs than equity issues. For example, the average total offering cost for debt 
issues is only 5.63 percent of the total proceeds raised, while it averages 20.99 percent of 
total proceeds raised for equity issues. Consistent with prior studies, debt-issuers are 
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 much larger than equity issuers, raise greater amount of capital and have higher fixed 
assets ratio than equity issuers. Equity issuers have higher market-to-book ratio, greater 
expenses on research and development, greater stock return volatility and better pre-issue 
stock market performance than debt-issuers. In contrast, straight-debt issuers have higher 
tax payment, more cash flows, greater amount of long-term debts and better profitability 
than equity issuers. These differences are all significant at 1 percent level. 
Insert Table 12 here 
 
B. Determinants of Financing Choice 
Table 13 reports the probit regression results of the first-step in Heckman (1979) 
two-step procedure. Consistent with Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), firms with smaller asset 
size, less tax payment, greater standard deviation of residual returns, and better stock 
market performance are more likely to issue equity than debt. The coefficient of 
PCHANN is 0.364, significant at the 1 percent level and the coefficient of INVANN is –
2.414, still significant at the 1 percent level. And the interaction term between them is 
0.861, significant at the 5 percent level. The results indicate that information asymmetry 
reduces the probability of equity issues over debt issues. But the negative impact on 
equity issue probability is mitigated by the positive impact of information production. 
The evidence not only supports Myers and Majluf (1984) that information asymmetry 
might reduce the probability of equity financing compared with debt financing, but also 
supports the argument in Fulghiery and Lukin(2001) that when information production is 
endogenous, firms facing high levels of information asymmetry may issue equity rather 
than debt.  
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 Insert Table 13 here 
 
C. Determinants on Offering Costs and Market Reaction 
C.1. Results on Direct Offering Costs 
Panel A of Table 14 reports the OLS regression results with robust variance, for 
models where the dependent variable is direct offering costs. The existence of selection 
bias can be examined in two ways. First, compare the coefficients of the OLS model 
adjusting for self-selection bias with OLS model without correcting the selection-bias. 
There will be substantial differences if selection bias exists. In deed, Panel A shows 
substantial differences in determinants of direct offering costs between results obtained 
from models controlling for selection bias and from models that do not. For example, the 
coefficient of ABCUMRET, the pre-issue cumulative abnormal return, is –0.026 for 
straight debt issues without controlling for selection bias, and is both economically and 
statistically insignificant. It becomes –0.145 and is significant at the 10 percent level after 
controlling for selectivity. Second, self-selection can be detected by examining whether 
the inverse mills ratio is significant or not. For both straight debt issues and equity issues, 
the inverse mills ratio is significant at the 1 percent level. These results suggest that 
selection-bias exists when firms choose their financing types. Therefore controlling for 
the selection bias is important to obtain consistent estimates on determinants of the 
offering costs or market reactions. Consistent with Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004) 
who examine determinants of investment banking fees among SEO firms, I find that 
stock market liquidity (measured by TURNOVER) reduces direct offering costs for 
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 seasoned equity issues.32 Straight debt issues by multiple book runners pay less direct 
offerings costs. For both straight debt and equity issues, direct offering costs are reduced 
for firms with more analyst coverage whereas they are increased for firms with greater 
relative issue size, or greater residual return standard deviation. If analyst coverage and 
residual return standard deviation measure information asymmetry, the results indicate 
that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry also pay higher direct offering 
costs. Based on the estimates of parameters controlling for selectivity, I estimate the 
direct offering costs if the alternative security had been issued. Panel B compares the 
mean difference between the actual direct offering costs and the hypothetical direct 
offering costs if the same firms had issued the alternative security type. For straight debt 
issues the actual mean direct offering costs are 1.093 percent of proceeds, 2.447 percent 
less than the average hypothetical direct offering costs if these debt-issuers had issued 
equity. On average the proceeds debt-issuers raised are $210.05 million, therefore it 
means that straight debt issuers could have saved $4.968 million than if they had issued 
equity instead. In contrast, equity issuers would have paid 3.374 percent less direct costs 
and saved $2.733 million if they had issued straight-debt. However, I cannot conclude 
that equity issuers did not choose the security type to minimize the offering costs because 
I have not considered the indirect offering costs yet. Only when we combine the direct 
and indirect offering costs together, we can determine whether or not firms choose the 
security type that is less costly for their shareholders’ benefits. The results are 
                                                 
32 Investment banks fees represent the lion’s share of direct offering costs. Direct offerings costs are the 
sum of investment banking fees, accounting fees, legal fees, printing and other expenses. However, the 
information on expenses except investment banking fees is missing for many firms in SDC data. I assume 
these fees are equal to zero if they are missing when we calculate the direct offering costs. That’s why the 
direct offering costs are close to gross spreads. The results are qualitatively the same when we use gross 
spread to proxy for the direct offering costs.  
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 qualitatively very similar when I use gross spreads as the dependent variable. They are 
not reported for the sake of brevity.  
Insert Table 14 here 
 
C.2. Event Study Results 
Panel A of Table 15 reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different 
event windows and compares CARs of straight debt issues with CARs of equity issues. 
Consistent with previous studies (see Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis (1986), Smith 
(1986), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) and among others), the stock market reactions to 
seasoned equity issues are significantly negative. The three-day CAR is –1.759 percent. 
On the equity-issue announcement dates, the stock prices drop 0.735 percent on average. 
In contrast, the stock market reactions to straight debt issues are insignificantly different 
from zero for all four-event windows.  The results show that there is insignificant market 
reaction of –0.003 percent on the announcement dates of straight debt issues. CAR(-
1,+1), the three-day cumulative abnormal for SEOs in my study are greater than what are 
documented in prior studies, which is often below minus 2.5 percent. One reason may be 
that all the sample firms in my study are followed by at least one financial analyst, which 
may help improve firm valuation. In deed, originally I have 2,106 equity issuers with the 
CAR(-1, +1) available, with an average CAR(-1, +1) of –2.60 percent. Panel B of Table 
15 compares the CAR(-1, +1) for firms without analyst coverage and firms with analyst 
coverage. For equity issuers with analyst coverage the average CAR(-1, +1) is –2.145 
percent, whereas it is –5.341 for equity issuers without analyst coverage. The difference 
is significant at 1 percent level. The average CAR(-1, +1) for straight debt issuers with 
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 analyst coverage is also greater than the average CAR(-1, +1) for straight debt issuers 
without analyst coverage. Panel C of Table 15 reports the CAR(-1, +1) for the ten groups 
generated by dividing all the 2,545 sample firms with complete information into quintiles 
according to analyst coverage and further classifying each analyst coverage quintile into 
debt and equity groups. The stock market reacts most negatively to equity-issuers with 
the least analyst coverage, whereas stock market reacts most positively to debt issuers 
with the least analyst coverage.  However, the CAR(-1, +1) does not change 
monotonically with increase in analyst coverage for both equity and debt issuers.  
Insert Table 15 here 
 
C.3. Results on Three-day Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Panel A of Table 16 reports the determinants on three-day CARs for straight debt 
issues and equity issues. The inverse mills ratio (IMR) in the regression of equity issues is 
-1.19 and is significant at 5 percent level. After controlling for the selection bias, for debt 
issues the pre-issue cumulative abnormal returns is the only variable that significantly 
affects CAR(-1,+1); for equity issues, the standard deviation of residual returns is the 
other variable besides IMR that has significant impact on CAR(-1, +1). My results are 
different from prior studies that ignore the selection bias. For example, Jung et. al. (1996) 
find that relative issue size is the only significant determinant on market reaction to debt 
issues whereas market-to-book ratio and cash flow to asset ratio affect market reaction to 
equity issues. Panel B of Table 6 shows that market reaction to straight debt issuers 
would have changed from 0.034 percent to –0.965 percent if they had issued equity. In 
contrast, market reaction to equity-issuers would have become –0.012 percent from –
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 1.759 percent if they had issued straight-debt. These changes are significant at the 1 
percent level.  
Insert Table 16 here 
 
C.4. Results on Indirect Offering Costs 
Following Asquith-Mullin (1986) and Bayless (1994), I assess the impact of 
security issue announcements on market values and consider it as the indirect costs for 
security offerings, INDCP. INDCP is denoted as percentage of principal amount raised, 
thereby is comparable with direct offering cost, DCP. Panel A of Table 17 shows that 
inverse mills ratios are significant and the coefficients differ substantially between OLS 
model without controlling for selection-bias and OLS model correcting for it, indicating 
self-selection bias exists when I use indirect offering costs as dependent variable. Bayless 
(1994) shows that the offering costs of an equity issue are 35.4 to 48.6 percent greater 
than those of a straight debt issue by firms with similar size and gross proceeds. Bayless 
does not estimate what the indirect cost would have been if the same firm had issued the 
alternative security type. Correcting for the selection bias, I find that the indirect offering 
costs would have risen significantly by 9.77 percent if debt-issuers had offered equity, 
which is equivalent to an increase of $19.653 million assuming a debt-issuer raises the 
average proceeds of $201.14 million for debt issues. In contrast, if an equity issuer had 
offered straight debt, their indirect offering costs would have increased significantly by 
3.154 percent, which is equivalent to $3.956 million assuming that the equity issuing 
company realizes the average proceeds of $110.51 million for equity issues. I have shown 
that on average if an equity issuer had offered debt, its direct offering cost would have 
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 increased by 3.374 percent. The results suggest that there is a tradeoff between direct and 
indirect offering costs for equity issuers in case they had offered debt. As a result, it is 
necessary to examine the total offering costs to decide whether equity issuers choose the 
cheaper financing type. 
Insert Table 17 here 
 
C.5. Results on Total Offering Costs 
Table 18 compares the mean actual total offering costs and the hypothetical total 
offerings costs if a firm had issued the alternative security type. For straight debt offering 
firms, their total offering costs would have amounted to 17.85 percent if they had offered 
equity. The 11.22 percent increase is significant at the 1 percent level, and is equivalent 
to $24.58 million. In contrast, the actual total offering costs for equity issuers are 20.99 
percent of proceeds, which would have risen slightly by 0.206 percent (equivalent to 
$0.23 million increase) if these equity-issuing companies had offered debt. The increase 
is both statistically and economically insignificant. The results support the offering cost 
minimization hypothesis that firms choose the financing type that minimizes the offering 
costs because choosing the alternative security type will not enable firms to save offering 
costs. 
Insert Table 18 here 
 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
 This paper investigates whether selectivity exists when firms choose to issue 
equity or debt, and whether managers choose to issue the security type that minimizes the 
offering costs thereby acting in shareholders’ interests or choose the security type for 
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 their own benefits. I apply Heckman ’s (1979) two-stage method to jointly examine the 
security choice and the offering costs. This procedure corrects the selection bias and 
enables the estimation of the offering costs that would have occurred if the same firm had 
issued the alternative security type. I consider the direct offering costs, indirect offering 
cost and total offering costs and control for many factors that may affect firms’ financing 
choices and offering costs, which include access to capital markets, expected information 
production, information asymmetry, firms’ growth opportunities, tax payments, tangible 
and intangible assets, pre-issue stock market performance as well as absolute and relative 
issue size, etc. My results show that self-selection bias exists when firms choose to issue 
securities. Debt-issuers would have had a significantly increase in offerings costs if they 
had issued equity. Equity-issuers would have had an insignificant increase in total 
offering costs if they had offered debt. These results indicate that managers in security 
offering firms choose the less expensive financing type when they seek external 
financing. 
 I also find that stock market reaction to straight debt issue announcements is 
insignificantly negative on the announcement dates and other event windows, which is 
inconsistent with the finding in Howton, Howton and Perfect (1998) that the market 
reaction on the announcement dates of straight debt financing is significantly negative. 
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of market reactions to security 
issue announcements and on the determinants of direct offering costs, and indirect 
offering costs with the selection bias controlled for. For the same set of independent 
variables, many of their impacts on market reaction and offering costs differ between 
straight debt issuers and equity issuers. For example, for straight debt issuers, pre-issue 
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 cumulative abnormal return is the only significant variable that affect the market reaction 
to security issue announcements; for equity issuers, besides the inverse mills ratio, the 
standard deviation of residual returns is the only significant variable to explain market 
reactions. Consistent with Butler et al (2004), I find that stock market liquidity reduces 
the direct offering costs. 
I also find that analyst coverage reduces investment banking fees and direct 
offering costs for both equity issues and straight debt offerings. It will be interesting in 
future to investigate the relationship between analyst coverage, stock price 
informativeness and corporate bonds’ yield, because empirical studies on analyst 
coverage and the cost of raising capital are limited, the extant studies focus on analyst 
behavior, and on how analyst forecast properties affect stock returns.  
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Figure 1  
Analyst coverage and time 
 
The vertical axis stands for the average number of analysts following security issuers (ANA), and the 
horizontal axis stands for the month relative to the offering month, 0. Negative (positive) month number 
denotes the number of month before (after) the security offering month. 
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 Table 1 
Sample distribution of security offerings over 1984-2002 period 
 
The sample firms do not belong to financial (SIC 6000-6999) nor utility industries (SIC 4900-4949). These 
firms have complete information from SDC’s Global New issues database, I/B/E/S historical Summary 
database, CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  
 
Year Number of straight debt 
issues 
Number of primary 
equity issues 
Total 
1984  36 31  67 
1985  73 43 116 
1986 100 48 148 
1987  69 54 123 
1988  63 17  80 
1989  59 36  95 
1990  54 29  83 
1991 111                 102 213 
1992 119 81 200 
1993 153                 105 258 
1994  85 72 157 
1995 126                 113 239 
1996 132                 119 251 
1997 132 85 217 
1998 149 61 210 
1999 114 94 208 
2000  70                 119 189 
2001 103  80 183 
2002  83 86 169 
Total                1831               1375                3206 
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 Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
This Table reports the summary statistics for the principal variables. ANNCH is the change in analyst 
coverage, calculated as the post-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage minus the pre-issue 12-month mean 
analyst coverage. ANN is the pre-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio, 
calculated as market value at prior fiscal year end plus book value of total assets minus book value of 
equity, then divided by the book value of assets. LNTA is natural logarithm of book value of total assets. 
FIXTA is the ratio of net value of property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets (TA). 
TXTTA is the ratio of tax payments to the book value of total assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in 
research & development to book value of total assets. I assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is 
missing in COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets. CFLTA is 
the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by book value of total assets. ABCUMRET is pre-
issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] 
period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is the beta 
coefficient of the market return in the market model, obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the 
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard 
deviation of the residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading 
turnover over [-252, -1] period. Daily trading turnover the daily trading volume divided by the number of 
outstanding shares. All information from COMPUSTAT is at the fiscal year end prior to the security 
offering year. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic under the null hypothesis that the mean 
difference between debt group and equity group is equal to zero. ASYIND is information asymmetry index 
using the following equation based on Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004): 
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Where Xik is the kth variable used as information asymmetry measure, which include -ANN, -LNTA, -
TURNOVER, XRDTA, MBKR and RESIDSD. 
 
Variables Total Sample 
mean 
(3206 obs) 
Debt sample 
mean 
(1831 obs) 
Equity sample 
mean 
(1375 obs) 
Mean 
difference 
 
T-stat 
  H0: dif = 0 
  Ha: dif ≠ 0 
ANNCH 0.6894 0.1300 1.4344 -1.3045a -16.08 
ANN 12.0039 16.5111 6.0020 10.5092a  39.79 
ASYIND 0.4658 0.3813 0.5783 -0.1970a -42.19 
MBKR 2.2339 1.6176 3.0546 -1.4370a -13.75 
LNTA 6.8700 8.1634 5.1478 3.0156a  54.47 
FIXTA 0.1184 0.4414 0.3231 0.1183a  13.76 
TXTTA 0.0257 0.0310 0.0188 0.0122a  11.83 
XRDTA 0.0510 0.0147 0.0993 -0.0846a -16.27 
LTDTA 0.2491 0.2726 0.2177 0.0550a    7.86 
CFLTA 0.0506 0.1009 -0.0165 0.1174a  15.57 
ROA 0.0990 0.1570 0.0218 0.1352a  17.05 
ABCUMRET 0.3519 0.0087 0.8089 -0.8002a -17.48 
BETA 0.9519 0.8956 1.0270 -0.1314a  -6.46 
RESIDSD 0.0265 0.0191 0.0363 -0.0172a -36.34 
TURNOVER 0.5443 0.3625 0.7863 -0.4238a -20.60 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 3 
Firm quality and information production 
 
This Tables reports the univariate test results on the relationship between firm quality and information 
production. Firm quality is measured by ABCUMRET, MBKR, and ROA. Information production is 
measured by ANNCH. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-
issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted 
return over the same period. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value at prior fiscal year 
end plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, then divided by the book value of assets. 
ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided 
by book value of total assets. Change in analyst coverage is calculated as the post-issue 12-month mean 
analyst coverage minus the pre-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage.  
 
Panel A. Pre-issue cumulative abnormal return and change in analyst coverage 
ABCUMRET quartiles 
 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: D – E ≥ 0 
              Ha: D – E < 0) 
Quartile 1 (low) -0.1155 (631) 0.6919   (171) -0.8074a (-4.407) 
Quartile 2  0.1029 (588) 1.1392   (275) -1.0363a (-6.343) 
Quartile 3  0.3497 (466) 1.4153   (443) -1.0656a (-6.638) 
Quartile 4 (High)  0.5985 (146) 1.7341   (655) -1.1356a  (-4.853) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.7140a 
(-2.972) 
-1.0421a 
(-5.956) 
 
 
Panel B. Market-to-book ratio and change in analyst coverage 
MBKR quartiles Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: D – E ≥ 0 
              Ha: D – E < 0) 
Quartile 1 (Low) -0.0091  (570) 1.0236  (232) -1.0327a (-6.552) 
Quartile 2 0.1530  (539) 1.0843  (262) -0.9313a (-6.038) 
Quartile 3 0.2045  (484) 1.5024  (329) -1.2979a (-8.379) 
Quartile 4 (High) 0.2593  (238) 1.7283  (563) -1.4690a  (-6.500) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
             Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.2684 
(-1.191) 
-0.7047a
(-4.444) 
 
 
Panel C. Profitability and change in analyst coverage 
ROA quartiles 
 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: D – E ≥ 0 
              Ha: D – E < 0) 
Quartile 1 (low) 0.2744  (210) 1.3021  (592) -1.0277a (-5.052) 
Quartile 2 0.0061  (516) 1.2575   (285) -1.2514a (-7.959) 
Quartile 3 0.0893  (550) 1.6006  (252) -1.5114a (-8.595) 
Quartile 4 (high) 0.2308  (555) 1.7877  (246) -1.5568a  (-9.143) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
             Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
0.0435 
(0.205) 
-0.4856a 
(-3.044) 
 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 4 
Information asymmetry and information production 
 
This Tables reports the univariate test results on the relationship between information asymmetry and 
information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is measured by INVANN and ASYIND. Information 
production is measured by ANNCH. INVANN is inverse analyst coverage, the reciprocal of the pre-issue 
12-month average analyst coverage. ANNCH is the change in analyst coverage, calculated as the post-issue 
12-month mean analyst coverage minus the pre-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage (ANN). ASYIND is 
information asymmetry index using the following equation based on Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004): 
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Where Xik is the kth variables used as information asymmetry measures, which include -ANN, -LNTA, -
TURNOVER, XRDTA, MBKR and RESIDSD. LNTA is natural logarithm of book value of total assets.  
TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading turnover over [-252, -1] period. Daily trading turnover the 
daily trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in 
research & development to book value of total assets. I assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is 
missing in COMPUSTAT. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value at prior fiscal year 
end plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, then divided by the book value of assets. 
RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the residual returns of the market model, which regresses a firm’s 
daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period.   
 
Panel A. Inverse analyst coverage and information production 
Inverse Analyst 
coverage  Quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: D – E ≥ 0 
              Ha: D – E < 0) 
Quartile 1 (Low) -0.3682 (748) 0.7080   (55) -1.0763a (-2.524) 
Quartile 2 0.2202 (610) 1.0927   (199) -0.8725a (-4.375) 
Quartile 3 0.7331 (315) 1.4941   (479) -0.7610a (-4.657) 
Quartile 4 (high) 0.9378 (158) 1.5581   (642) -0.6202a  (-4.487) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
             Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-1.3061a
(-8.144) 
-0.8500b
(-2.031) 
 
 
Panel B. Information asymmetry index and information production 
Information asymmetry 
index quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: D – E ≥ 0 
              Ha: D – E < 0) 
Quartile 1 (low) -0.1467 (721) 0.8644   (675) -1.0111a (-3.357) 
Quartile 2 0.3454 (612) 1.1489   (189) -0.8035a (-4.436) 
Quartile 3 0.1894 (427) 1.4696   (375) -1.2802a (-8.228) 
Quartile 4 (high) 0.7257 (71) 1.5536   (730) -0.8278a  (-4.163) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.8725a 
(-4.199) 
-0.6892b 
(-2.335) 
 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 5 
Firm quality, information asymmetry and information production 
 
The whole sample are first divided into two groups according to whether the measure on information 
asymmetry (inverse analyst coverage or information asymmetry index) is greater than the corresponding 
median value of the the whole sample or not; within each information asymmetry group, I further divide 
the sample into two groups depending on whether an observation has measures on firm quality (return on 
assets, pre-issue cumulative abnormal return respectively) that are greater than the corresponding median 
value for the whole sample or not. Eventually I divide the four groups classified by information asymmetry 
and firm quality measures into eight groups based on the type of financing: equity or debt. Information 
production is measured by the change in analyst coverage. T-stat is the t-statistic on H0: Difference=0 and 
Ha: Difference ≠ 0.  
 
Panel A. Return on assets, inverse analyst coverage and change in analyst coverage 
Return on assets: ≤  median Return on assets: > median Inverse mean 
analyst coverage Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
: ≤  median -0.3356 
(483) 
0.5340 
(148) 
-0.8696a 
(-3.830) 
0.0239 
(875) 
1.6731 
(106) 
-1.6492a 
(-5.810) 
: > median  0.9170 
(243) 
1.4406 
(807) 
-0.5236a 
(-3.418) 
0.6795 
(230) 
1.6984 
(392) 
-1.0189a
(-6.597) 
 
Panel B. Pre-issue abnormal return, inverse analyst coverage and change in analyst coverage 
Pre-issue abnormal return: ≤  median Pre-issue abnormal return: > median Inverse analyst 
coverage Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
: ≤  median -0.1980 
(919) 
0.6710 
(92) 
-0.8690a 
(-3.277) 
0.0930 
(439) 
1.2015 
(1066) 
-1.1086a 
(-4.533) 
: > median  0.5652 
(300) 
1.0248 
(292) 
-0.4595a 
(-3.089) 
1.2112 
(173) 
1.7090 
(829) 
-0.4978a
(-2.870) 
 
Panel C. Return on assets, information asymmetry index and change in analyst coverage 
Return on assets: ≤  median Return on assets: > median information 
asymmetry index Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
:≤  median -0.0676 
(572) 
0.9920 
(189) 
-1.0596a 
(-5.466) 
0.1895 
(761) 
1.2304 
(81) 
-1.0409a 
(-3.868) 
:> median  0.6455 
(154) 
1.3688 
(688) 
-0.7233a 
(-3.633) 
0.0959 
(344) 
1.7829 
(417) 
-1.6870a
(-10.472) 
 
Panel D. Pre-issue abnormal return, information asymmetry index and change in analyst coverage 
Pre-issue abnormal return: ≤  median Pre-issue abnormal return: > median Information 
asymmetry index Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
Debt 
(# obs) 
Equity 
(# obs) 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
: ≤  median -0.0768 
(909) 
0.8753 
(106) 
-0.9521a 
(-4.229) 
0.4136 
(424) 
1.1852 
(164) 
-0.7715a 
(-3.582) 
: > median  0.1852 
(310) 
0.9647 
(278) 
-0.7795a 
(-4.783) 
0.3987 
(188) 
1.7134 
(827) 
-1.3147a
(-6.537) 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 6 
Regressions without controlling endogeneity of information production 
 
Endogeneity here means that the financing choices may affect information production and in the mean time 
information production may affect the financing choices. This Table shows results not considering such 
endogeneity. EDDUM is a dummy variable, which equals one if equity is issued, and zero if debt is issued.  
ANN is the pre-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage. INVANN is the reciprocal of ANN. ASYIND is 
information asymmetry index. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value at prior fiscal 
year end plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, then divided by the book value of 
assets. LNTA is natural logarithm of book value of total assets. FIXTA is the ratio of net value of property, 
plant and equipment to the book value of total assets (TA). TXTTA is the ratio of tax payments to the book 
value of total assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in research & development to book value of total 
assets. We assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is missing in COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio 
of long-term debt to book value of total assets. CFLTA is the ratio of cash flow to book value of total 
assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
divided by book value of total assets. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a 
firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ 
value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is the beta coefficient of the market return in the market 
model, obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return 
over [-255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the residual returns of the market model. 
TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading turnover over [-252, -1] period. Daily trading turnover is 
the daily trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares. # OBS is the number of 
observations. 
 
Panel A. OLS regression with robust error 
The dependent variable is change in analyst coverage 
Independent variable Model  
1 
Model  
2 
Model  
3 
EDDUM 0.7792a 0.8152a 0.8005a
ANN -0.0640a   
INVANN  0.4986a  
ASYIND   -0.6053 
MBKR 0.0927a 0.0627b 0.0647b
ROA 1.0696a 1.1531a 1.1041a
LNTA 0.0285 -0.1462a -0.2075a
ABCUMRET 0.1463a 0.1400a 0.1454a
RESIDSD -0.0968b -0.0602 -0.0361 
CONSTANT 0.8196a 1.0966a 1.8442 
R2 0.1199 0.0958 0.0949 
# OBS                 3206 3206                 3206 
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 Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Probit regression with robust error 
EDDUM is dependent variable. EDDUM equals 1 if equity is issued and 0 otherwise. 
Independent 
variable 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
ANNCH    0.0648a 0.0721a 0.0647a
INVANN  -0.7363a   -0.8371a  
ASYIND   0.2740   0.0338 
MBKR 0.1775a 0.1737a 0.1704a 0.1531a 0.1457a 0.1523a
LNTA -0.5295a -0.5788a -0.5181a -0.5155a -0.5709a -0.5141a
FIXTA 0.3643b 0.2885c 0.3878b 0.3325b 0.2423 0.3354b
TXTTA -4.1049b -4.5064a -4.0488b -4.2719b -4.7649a -4.2650b
XRDTA 3.0526a 3.0455a 2.7912b 3.5757a 3.6179a 3.5422a
LTDTA -0.1443 -0.0484 -0.1489 -0.1894 -0.0856 -0.1900 
CFLTA 0.9072 1.0502 0.8830 0.7671 0.9164 0.7644 
ROA -3.5261a -3.7185a -3.5336a -3.3022a -3.4917a -3.3034a
ABCUMRET 0.8124a 0.8367a 0.8114a 0.7806a 0.8035a 0.7805a
BETA -0.0518 -0.0976 -0.0486 -0.0965 -0.1535b -0.0961 
RESIDSD 0.1550a 0.1512a 0.1459a 0.1616a 0.2024a 0.1605a
TURNOVER 0.4242a 0.4265a 0.4514a 0.3939a 0.3060a 0.3972a
CONSTANT 2.7548a 2.6957a 2.5705a 2.6892a 3.2677a 2.6665a
Pseudo R2 0.5613 0.5614 0.5614 0.5657 0.5702 0.5657 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 7 
Regressions controlling endogeneity of information production for the whole sample 
firms 
 
I first run the following probit model for the whole sample firms: 
)
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Then I use the predicted value of the above probit model, EHAT, the predicted probability of equity issues 
versus debt issues, to explain change in analyst coverage in the following OLS model: 
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNEHATANNCH 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
PCHANN (RCHANN) is the predicted (residual) value of the OLS model above. PCHANN is the predicted 
change in analyst coverage. RCHANN is the residual change of analyst coverage. Both are used to measure 
expected information production due to security offerings. INVANN is the reciprocal of ANN. ASYIND is 
the information asymmetry index. PCHANN*INVANN is the product of PCHANN and INVANN. 
PCHANN)ASYIND is the product of PCHANN and ASYIND. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio, calculated 
as market value at prior fiscal year end plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, then 
divided by the book value of assets. LNTA is natural logarithm of book value of total assets. FIXTA is the 
ratio of net value of property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets (TA). TXTTA is the 
ratio of tax payments to the book value of total assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in research & 
development to book value of total assets. I assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is missing in 
COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets. CFLTA is the ratio of 
cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by book value of total assets. ABCUMRET is pre-issue 
abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] 
period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is the beta 
coefficient of the market return in the market model, obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the 
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard 
deviation of the residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading 
turnover over [-252, -1] period. Daily trading turnover s the daily trading volume divided by the number of 
outstanding shares. # OBS is the number of observations. 
 
Panel A. OLS regression with robust error 
The dependent variable is ANNCH, change in analyst coverage. 
Independent variable Coefficient t P >|t| 
EHAT 1.8182a 6.73 0.000 
ANN -0.0641a -8.26 0.000 
MBKR 0.0946a 2.86 0.002 
ROA 1.0231a 4.71 0.000 
LNTA 0.1616a 2.96 0.000 
ABCUMRET 0.1211a 3.84 0.003 
RESIDSD -0.1707a -3.92 0.000 
CONSTANT -0.3321 -0.73 0.464 
R2 0.1206 
# OBS 3206 
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 Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Probit regression with robust errors 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
PCHANN 0.2220b 0.4153a 0.4185a 0.2538b -0.2156 
INVANN  -1.0214a -2.2446a   
PCHANN*INVANN   0.7894c   
ASYIND    -0.4085 -1.3287c
PCHANN*ASYIND     1.2225a
MBKR 0.1517a 0.1233a 0.1003b 0.1586a 0.1436a
LNTA -0.4605a -0.4703a -0.4536a -0.4677a -0.4484a
FIXTA 0.4216a 0.3655b 0.3272b 0.3948b 0.3568b
TXTTA -3.2680c -3.0931c -2.7668 -3.2310b -2.9662c
XRDTA 3.1591a 3.2150a 3.1777a 3.5711a 3.4808a
LTDTA -0.2135 -0.1423 -0.0962 -0.2161 -0.1974 
CFLTA 0.6931 0.7042 0.5694 0.6997 0.5321 
ROA -3.2901a -3.3533a -3.1868a -3.2470a -3.0288a
ABCUMRET 0.6840a 0.6059a 0.5135a 0.6672a 0.6320a
BETA -0.0163 -0.0502 -0.0491 -0.0163 -0.0153 
RESIDSD 0.1590a 0.2154a 0.2408a 0.1731a 0.1724a
TURNOVER 0.3858a 0.2435b 0.1960c 0.3401b 0.3373b
CONSTANT 2.1135a 2.2692a 2.2043a 2.2970a 2.4805a
Pseudo R2 0.5625 0.5685 0.5692 0.5626 0.5643 
 
Panel C. Probit regression with robust errors  
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
RCHANN 0.0622a 0.0658a 0.0154 0.0620a 0.0596a
INVANN  -0.7827a -0.7151a   
RCHANN*INVANN   0.3760a   
ASYIND    0.2110 -1.1718c
RCHANN*ASYIND     0.7678a
MBKR 0.1612a 0.1561a 0.1524a 0.1559a 0.1333a
LNTA -0.5354a -0.5888a -0.5950a -0.5266a -0.4560a
FIXTA 0.3175b 0.2339 0.2800c 0.3356b 0.3237b
TXTTA -4.5012a -4.9651a -4.9465a -4.4587a -3.2942c
XRDTA 3.5275a 3.5421a 3.4995a 3.3228a 4.1583a
LTDTA -0.1679 -0.0672 -0.1276 -0.1716 -0.2366 
CFLTA 0.8343 0.9846 0.7777 0.8165 0.4868 
ROA -3.3783a -3.5714a -3.3870a -3.3843a -2.9187a
ABCUMRET 0.8177a 0.8430a 0.8445a 0.8169 0.6277a
BETA -0.1048 -0.1564b -0.1465c -0.1022 -0.0618 
RESIDSD 0.1602a 0.1980a 0.1890a 0.1533a 0.1847a
TURNOVER 0.4062a 0.3261a 0.2881a 0.4269a 0.2947b
CONSTANT 2.8715a 3.4242a 3.4670a 2.7291a 2.5279a
Pseudo R2 0.5652 0.5691 0.5725 0.5652 0.5676 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 8 
Change in analyst coverage and long-run post-issue buy and hold cumulative 
abnormal return 
 
Change in analyst coverage is the difference between the 12-month average analyst coverage after security 
offerings and the 12-month average analyst coverage before security offerings. The post-issue buy-and-
hold abnormal return is calculated according to the following equation: 
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Where n=1, 2 or 3, τ=252 if n=1, τ=504 if n=2, and τ=756 if n=3. Rjt is firm j’s daily return since the 
second day of security offerings. RMt is the market’s daily return, which is measured by the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index return. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio. LNTA is natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets. FIXTA is the ratio of net value of property, plant and equipment to 
the book value of total assets (TA). ROA is return on assets. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal 
cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] period minus 
the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is the beta coefficient of 
the market return in the market model, obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-
NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the 
residual returns of the market model.  
 
Panel A. Change in analyst coverage and post-issue one-year abnormal return 
Change in Analyst 
coverage quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat: H0: D – E ≤0 
              Ha: D –E > 0) 
Quartile 1 (low) -3.9582a  (616) -6.5283   (124) 2.5701 (0.476) 
Quartile 2 -4.9808a  (452) -12.7662a  (310) 7.7854b (2.272) 
Quartile 3 0.1904   (323) -9.1483a  (428) 9.3387a (2.644) 
Quartile 4 (high) 3.0094   (342) 13.3123c  (416) -10.3028  (-1.377) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
              Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-6.9676a 
(-2.830) 
-19.8406b 
(-2.231) 
 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q2-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q2-Q4 < 0) 
-7.9902a 
(-3.042) 
-26.0784a 
(-3.343) 
 
 
Panel B. Change in analyst coverage and post-issue two-year abnormal return 
Change in Analyst 
coverage quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat: H0: D – E ≤0 
              Ha: D –E > 0) 
Quartile 1 (low) -6.4199a   (527) -21.5867b   (105) 15.1668b  (1.755) 
Quartile 2 -7.4578b  (418) -29.4845a  (270) 22.0267a   (4.034) 
Quartile 3 -6.4585b  (301) -21.8634a  (382) 15.4049a   (2.718) 
Quartile 4 (high)   -1.5814  (308) -9.9316   (355) 8.3502    (1.191) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-4.8385
(-1.232) 
-11.6551
(-1.119) 
 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q2-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q2-Q4 < 0) 
-5.8763c 
(-1.364) 
-19.5528a 
(-2.516) 
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Panel C. Change in analyst coverage and post-issue three-year abnormal return 
Change in Analyst 
coverage quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat: H0: D – E ≤0 
              Ha: D –E > 0) 
Quartile 1 (low) -8.1482b   (473) -24.1738b   (87) 16.0256c (1.355) 
Quartile 2 -15.2857a  (380) -47.0627a  (233) 31.7770a   (4.142) 
Quartile 3 -12.3249a  (279) -33.6480a   (323) 21.3231a   (2.891) 
Quartile 4 (high) -5.9669    (284) -16.2861   (293) 10.3192  (0.843) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
              Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-2.1814 
(-0.3624) 
-7.8877 
(-0.4953) 
 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q2-Q4 ≥ 0 
              Ha: Q2-Q4 < 0) 
-9.3188c 
(-1.537) 
-30.7766a 
(-2.347) 
 
 
Panel D. Regressions of post-issue buy and hold abnormal return on change in analyst coverage 
Dependent variable: 
ABCUMRET1Y 
Dependent variable: 
ABCUMRET2Y 
Dependent variable: 
ABCUMRET3Y 
Independent 
variable 
debt equity debt equity debt equity 
ANNCH 1.031a 5.256a 1.248c 3.645b 0.526 4.542a
MBKR -2.876b -0.171 -4.460b -0.491 2.414 0.317 
ABCUMRET 6.840c -0.815 -8.890 -1.983 -6.116 -8.909b
ROA 17.139 9.242 43.304 2.215 23.502 -28.556 
BETA -4.797c -5.061 0.292 -7.595c 0.608 -11.774 
LNTA 2.244a -0.367 5.200a 5.076a 8.728a 8.889a
CONSTANT -14.188c -2.161 -48.284a -39.734a -89.456a -63.458a
R2 0.017 0.015 0.022 0.020 0.027 0.023 
# OBS 1733 1278 1554 1112 1416 936 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
 87
  
Table 9 
Robust tests: Regressions controlling endogeneity of information production based 
on randomly selected half sample firms 
 
The whole 3206 sample firms are randomly divided into two sample groups with equal sample size: the 
base group and the test group. I first run the following probit model on the base group and test group 
respectively to get EHAT for each group, EHAT is the predicted probability of equity issues over debt 
issues:  
)
()1(Pr
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Then I run the following OLS model for the base group: 
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNEHATANNCH 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
Next we multiply the coefficients of the independent variables in the above OLS regression by the 
corresponding values of independent variables for the test group. The resultant product, PCHANN, now is 
an ex-ante measure on expected information production for firms in the test group, because it is constructed 
based on all the information before security offerings. INVANN is the reciprocal of ANN, the pre-issue 12-
month average analyst coverage. ASYIND is the information asymmetry index. PCHANN*INVANN is the 
product of PCHANN and INVANN. PCHANN*ASYIND is the product of PCHANN and ASYIND. 
MBKR is Market-to-book ratio. LNTA is natural logarithm of book value of total assets. FIXTA is the ratio 
of net value of property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets (TA). TXTTA is the ratio of 
tax payments to the book value of total assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in research & 
development to book value of total assets. LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total 
assets. CFLTA is the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets. ABCUMRET 
is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-
252, -30] period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is 
the beta coefficient of the market return in the market model. RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the 
residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading turnover over [-252, -
1] period.  
Panel A. Probit regressions on base group and control group  
Independent variable Base               group 
(907 straight debt issues, 696 primary 
equity issues) 
Test                  group 
(924 straight debt issues, 679 primary 
equity issues 
MBKR 0.1523b 0.2266a
LNTA -0.5279a -0.5338a
FIXTA 0.4089c 0.3549 
TXTTA -2.6041 -5.1444a
XRDTA 1.5552 4.8237a
LTDTA -0.0821 -0.1732 
CFLTA 0.8674 0.9867 
ROA -3.2591b -4.0254a
ABCUMRET 0.8497a 0.8025a
BETA 0.0114 -0.1182 
RESIDSD 0.1477a 0.1653b
TURNOVER 0.5319a 0.3048c
CONSTANT 2.6158a 2.8634a
Pseudo R2 0.5598 0.5658 
# OBS 1603 1603 
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Panel B. OLS regression with robust error for the base group 
The dependent variable is change in analyst coverage. 
Independent variable Coefficient t P >|t| 
EHAT 2.0301a 5.59 0.000 
ANN -0.0722a -6.89 0.000 
MBKR 0.2006a 6.16 0.000 
ROA 1.4651a 5.05 0.000 
LNTA 0.2188a 3.10 0.002 
ABCUMRET 0.0583 1.04 0.296 
RESIDSD -0.1423b -2.51 0.012 
CONSTANT -1.1178c -1.92 0.055 
# obs 1603 
R2 0.1487 
 
Panel C. Probit regression with robust errors for the test group 
The dependent variable is EDDUM, which equals one if equity is issued, and 0 if straight debt is issued.  
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PCHANN 0.4963a 0.4843a 0.4564a -0.1509 
INVANN -0.7125b -2.4928a   
PCHANN*INVANN  1.2083b   
ASYIND   -1.1561 -2.1216b
PCHANN*ASYIND    1.5121 
MBKR 0.1013 0.0374 0.1594b 0.1332c
LNTA -0.4323a -0.4146a -0.4416a -0.4228a
FIXTA 0.4229c 0.3732c 0.3917c 0.3430 
TXTTA -3.0765 -2.3792 -3.2581 -2.9207 
XRDTA 4.7082a 4.5496a 5.9528a 5.6690a
LTDTA -0.2409 -0.1572 -0.3148 -0.2910 
CFLTA 0.6486 0.4512 0.4917 0.2069c
ROA -3.7275a -3.4994a -3.4400a -3.1325b
ABCUMRET 0.5465a 0.4280a 0.5549a 0.5346a
BETA -0.0457 -0.0398 -0.0269 -0.0230 
RESIDSD 0.1804a 0.2048a 0.1885a 0.1847a
TURNOVER 0.1639 0.1091 0.1186 0.1182 
CONSTANT 2.1283a 2.1535a 2.4712a 2.6894a
Pseudo R2 0.5728 0.5745 0.5708 0.5736 
# OBS 1603 1603 1603 1603 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 10 
Investor optimism, post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal return, and financing choice 
 
Investor optimism is measured by FE, LGTH, REVR and OPTIM. FER is the pre-issue 12-month mean 
forecast error. Forecast error is the mean annual consensus EPS forecast minus the actual annual EPS 
divided by the absolute value of the mean annual consensus EPS. LGTH is the pre-issue 12-month mean 
analysts’ long-term EPS growth rate forecast. REVIR is the pre-issue 12-month mean IBES revision ratio. 
The revision ratio is the number of analysts making upward revision minus the number of analysts making 
downward revision divided by the total number of analysts following a firm. OPTIM is investor optimism 
index based on the ranking of FER, LGTH and REVR. It is constructed using the following equation based 
on Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004): 
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Where Zik represents the kth variable used in constructing the investor optimism index. T-stat is t-statistic 
value on H0: Dif=0 and Ha: Dif≠0. 
 
Panel A. Comparison of investor optimism between debt issues and equity issues 
Pre-issue 12 month mean 
(t-stat) 
Post-issue 12 month mean 
(t-stat) 
Mean Change (post – pre) 
(t-stat) 
Variable 
debt equity dif debt equity dif debt equity dif 
FE 0.3584 
 
0.2187 
 
0.140
(1.19) 
0.3161 
 
0.4226 
 
-0.106
(-0.997) 
-0.042
(0.820) 
0.204b 
(2.57) 
-0.246c 
(-1.69) 
LGTH 0.1326 
 
0.2399 
 
-0.107a 
(-23.2) 
0.1303 
 
0.2423 
 
-0.112a 
(-26.8) 
-0.002a 
(-6.39) 
0.002 
(0.986) 
-0.005c
(-1.88) 
REVR -0.0614 
 
0.0212 
 
-0.083a
(-11.3) 
-0.0718 
 
-0.0050 
 
-0.067a 
(-8.52) 
-0.010c 
(-1.84) 
-0.026a
(-3.62) 
0.016c
(1.72) 
OPTIM 0.4558 
 
0.5704 
 
-0.115a 
(-22.6) 
0.4460 
 
0.5912 -0.145a
(-30.3) 
-0.010a 
(-3.72) 
0.021a 
(5.45) 
-0.003a
(-6.60) 
 
Panel B. OLS Regression results 
Dependent variable: 
ABCUMRET1Y 
Dependent variable: 
ABCUMRET2Y 
Dependent variable: 
ABCUMRET3y 
Independent 
variable 
debt equity debt equity debt equity 
ANNCH 1.277a 5.116a 1.760b 3.694b 1.282 3.068c
ANN 0.200 0.661 0.400c 1.013c 0.579c 0.963 
OPTIM -20.168b -56.826a -30.153b -74.659a -43.122b -149.010a
MBKR -2.757b 0.771 -2.926 -0.494 3.876 -1.732 
ABCUMRET 8.048b 1.117 -10.134 -1.010 -9.401 -8.228b
ROA 18.800 28.669b 28.105 30.304b 7.904 22.682 
BETA -4.743c -3.300 -1.344 -5.819 -0.370 -1.203 
LNTA 1.764b -3.085 3.721b -1.900 5.604b -4.062a
CONSTANT -5.460 33.404c -28.818c 28.494 -54.095b 74.355b
R2 0.031 0.041 0.022 0.036 0.027 0.036 
# OBS 1671 935 1495 810 1360 687 
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Panel C. Probit model regression results 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
OPTIM -0.1702 -0.3327 -0.1192 -0.1884 
ANNCH  0.0601a   
PCHANN   0.4146a -0.3994c
INVANN   -2.5936b  
PCHANN*INVANN   0.9613  
ASYIND    -1.0626 
PCHANN*ASYIND    1.6583a
MBKR 0.2058a 0.1918a 0.0826 0.1255b
LNTA -0.5521a -0.5422a -0.4369a -0.4394a
FIXTA 0.4428a 0.4056b 0.4077b 0.4650a
TXTTA -2.6719 -2.8329 -1.6954 -1.6154 
XRDTA 3.0924a 3.5429a 3.2007a 5.6690a
LTDTA -0.1116 -0.1361 -0.1138 -0.1849 
CFLTA 0.3624 0.3159 0.0988 0.0127 
ROA -4.4446a -4.3327a -4.1556a -4.1103b
ABCUMRET 0.8123a 0.7821a 0.5184a 0.6399a
BETA -0.0539 -0.0927 -0.0217 -0.0089 
RESIDSD 0.2031a 0.2120a 0.2781a 0.2167a
TURNOVER 0.3317a 0.3107a 0.1986c 0.3000b
CONSTANT 3.0175a 3.0375a 2.2009a 2.4544a
Pseudo R2 0.5282 0.5324 0.5341 0.5340 
# OBS 2784 2784 2784 2784 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 11 
Sample distribution 
 
Year Straight debt issues Primary equity issues Total 
1984 36 22  58 
1985 66 25  91 
1986 96 37 133 
1987 65 43 108 
1988 60 14  74 
1989 57 23  80 
1990 50 21  71 
1991 81 67 148 
1992                  107 58 165 
1993                  136 83 219 
1994 65 50 115 
1995                  104 82 186 
1996                  106 63 169 
1997 90 61 151 
1998                  114 50 164 
1999 89 68 157 
2000 50 91 141 
2001 90 72 162 
2002 70 83 153 
Total                1532                    1013 2545 
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 Table 12 
Characteristic comparisons between equity issues and straight debt issues  
 
This Table reports summary statistics of the principal variables. DCP is direct offering cost, calculated as 
the sum of gross spread, accounting, printing, legal as well as miscellaneous fees as percentage of principal 
amount. If information on accounting, printing, legal or miscellaneous fees is missing we assume it is zero. 
CAR(-1,+1) is cumulative abnormal returns over the three-day event window. INDCP is indirect offering 
cost, defined as [(-1)*CAR(-1,+1)*market value on the day before issue announcement)/total proceeds 
raised]. TCP is total offering cost, equal to the sum of direct offerings cost and indirect offering cost. ANN 
is the pre-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage. LNPRDS is log of total proceeds raised. MBKR is 
Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value at prior fiscal year end plus book value of total assets 
minus book value of equity, then divided by the book value of assets. LNTA is log of book value of total 
assets. FIXTA is the ratio of net value of property, plant and equipment to the book value of total assets. 
TXTTA is the ratio of tax payments to the book value of total assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in 
research & development to book value of total assets. I assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is 
missing in COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets. CFLTA is 
the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by book value of total assets. ABCUMRET is pre-
issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] 
period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is the beta 
coefficient of the market return in the market model, obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the 
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard 
deviation of the residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading 
turnover over [-252, -1] period. Daily trading turnover the daily trading volume divided by the number of 
outstanding shares. RISIZE is relative issue size, defined as the ratio of proceeds raised to the market value 
of equity at the fiscal year end prior to the issue year. UWREPU is the lead underwriter’s reputation, 
measured as the market share of the lead manger. For equity issuers it is based on the entire SDC seasoned 
equity offerings database; for debt-issuers issuers, it is based on the entire SDC non-convertible debt 
offerings with maturity beyond one year. NUMBK is the number of book runners. 
 
Variables Straight debt 
(1532 observations) 
Equity 
(1013 observations) 
Mean Difference 
(T test, H0: Mean diff=0 
               Ha: Mean diff≠0) 
GSP (%) 1.077 4.822 -3.745a (-91.099) 
DCP (%) 1.094 5.311 -4.217a (-74.463) 
CAR(-1,+1) (%) 0.034 -1.759 1.793a (7.618) 
IDCP (%) 4.540 15.682 -11.142a (3.710) 
TCP (%) 5.634 20.993 -15.359a (-5.116) 
ANN 15.774 7.049 8.725a (29.605) 
ANNCH 0.211 1.461 -1.250a (-13.193) 
MBKR 1.532 2.339 -0.807a (-11.120) 
ROA 0.153 0.089 0.065a (12.997) 
LNTA 8.027 5.766 2.261a (41.245) 
FIXTA 0.445 0.357 0.088a (8.824) 
LNPRDS 5.053 4.169 24.642a (13.195) 
LTDTA 0.279 0.258 0.021b (2.577) 
TXTTA 0.030 0.020 0.010a (8.693) 
CFLTA 0.098 0.042 0.056a (11.268) 
XRDTA 0.013 0.056 -0.043a (-11.246) 
BETA 0.894 1.020 -0.126a (-5.426) 
RESIDSD 0.019 0.033 -0.014a (-27.860) 
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 Straight debt  
(1532 observations) 
Equity  
(1013 observations) 
 
Mean Difference 
(T test, H0: Mean diff=0 
               Ha: Mean diff≠0) 
ABCUMRET  0.007 0.659 -0.652a (-15.946) 
RISIZE 0.178 0.238 -0.060a      (-4.908) 
UWREPU 0.098 0.062  0.036a      (14.751) 
NUMBK 1.103 1.043  0.060a      (5.371) 
TURNOVER 0.363 0.764 -0.401a      (-17.693) 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 13 
Heckman two-step procedure: The first-step-probit regression results 
 
PCHANN is the predicted value of the following OLS model: 
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNEHATANNCH 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
Where EHAT is the predicted value of the following probit model: 
)
()1(Pr
121110987
6543210
TURNOVERRESIDSDBETAABCUMRETROACFLOWTA
LTDTAXRDTATXTTAFIXTALNTAMBKReddumob
ββββββ
βββββββ
++++++
++++++Φ==
  
PCHANN is the predicted change in analyst coverage. It is used to measure expected information 
production due to security offerings. LNTA is the logarithm of book value of total assets. INVANN is the 
reciprocal of ANN, the pre-issue 12-month average analyst coverage. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio. 
FIXTA is fixed assets to total assets ratio. TXTTA is the ratio of tax payments to the book value of total 
assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in research & development to book value of total assets. We 
assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is missing in COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio of long-
term debt to book value of total assets. CFLTA is the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA 
is the return on assets. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-
issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted 
return over the same period. BETA is the beta coefficient of the market return in the market model, 
obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-
255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the residual returns of the market model. 
TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading turnover over [-252, -1] period. # obs is the number of 
observations. The dependent variable is EDDUM, which equals 1 if primary equity is issued, otherwise 
equals 0 if straight debt is issued.  
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Z-stat    (P-value) 
PCHANN 0.363a 3.59 (0.002) 
INVANN -2.419a -3.39 (0.001) 
PCHANN*INVANN 0.861b 1.99 (0.047) 
MBKR 0.049 0.77 (0.444) 
LNTA -0.438a -9.39 (0.000) 
FIXTA 0.312c 1.92 (0.055) 
TXTAT -2.823 -1.53 (0.126) 
XRDTA 3.429a 2.94 (0.003) 
LTDTA -0.039 -0.18 (0.855) 
CFLTA 0.706 0.74 (0.449) 
ROA -4.033a -4.61 (0.000) 
ABCUMRET 0.583a 3.86 (0.000) 
BETA -0.056 -0.69 (0.488) 
RESIDSD 0.265a 5.18 (0.000) 
TURNOVER 0.203c 1.69 (0.095) 
CONSTANT 2.275a 6.31 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2 0.493  
# OBS 2545  
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 14 
Results on direct offering costs 
 
IMR is inverse mills ratio obtained through Heckman’s two-step procedure by running probit model in 
Table 2 first. ANNLN is natural logarithm value of (ANN+1). UWREPU is reputation of the lead 
underwriter. LNPRDS is natural logarithm value of total proceeds raised, PRDS. MBKDUM is a dummy 
variable, which equals one if a firm has multiple book runners, and zero otherwise. MBKR is market-to-
book value ratio. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return. RESIDSD is the standard 
deviation of the residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading 
turnover over [-252, -1] period. ROA is return on assets. RISZFY is relative issue size. The values in the 
parentheses are t-statistic values. 
 
Panel A. OLS regressions with robust variance. DCP is the dependent variable 
 Straight debt Equity 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS OLS ∆ in Coeff OLS OLS ∆ in Coeff 
ANNLN -0.380a
(-6.76) 
-0.285a
(-4.92) 
33.33% -0.576a
(-8.07) 
-0.543a
(-7.53) 
5.73% 
UWREPU -0.240 
(0.96) 
-0.246 
(-0.98) 
-2.50% -1.791a
(-3.06) 
-1.613a  
(2.67) 
9.94% 
LNPRDS -0.059c
(-1.84) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
101.69% -0.724a
(-12.99) 
-0.665a
(-10.52) 
8.15% 
MBKR 0.007 
(0.26) 
-0.030 
(-0.98) 
-528.57% 0.014 
(0.75) 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
-114.29% 
MBKDUM -0.314a
(-4.04) 
-0.290a
(-3.83) 
7.64% 0.104  
(0.73) 
0.138 
(0.96) 
32.69% 
TURNOVER 0.202b
(2.23) 
0.107 
(1.19) 
-47.03% -0.122c
(-1.88) 
-0.188a
(-2.73) 
-54.10% 
ROA -0.951b
(-2.58) 
-0.570 
(-1.53) 
40.06% -0.076 
(-0.28) 
-0.004 
(-0.01) 
94.74% 
RISZFY 0.575a
(2.60) 
0.575a
(2.71) 
0.00% 0.635a  
(2.76) 
0.500b  
(2.42) 
-21.26% 
AMCUMRET -0.025 
(-0.35) 
-0.145c
(-1.92) 
-480.00% -0.010 
(-0.40) 
-0.028 
(-1.16) 
-180.00% 
RESIDSD 0.279a
(6.42) 
0.228a
(5.25) 
-18.28% 0.305a
(7.32) 
0.287a
(6.78) 
-5.90% 
IMR  -0.231a
(-3.77) 
  -0.305a
(-2.74) 
 
CONSTANT 1.864a
(8.52) 
1.840a   
(8.58) 
 8.423a  
(27.77) 
8.428a  
(27.85) 
 
R-square 0.484 0.492  0.493 0.497  
# OBS 1532 1532  1013 1013  
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 Table 14 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Comparisons between mean DCP, and hypothetical DCP if a firm issued the alternative 
security instead 
 Straight debt (1532 observations) Equity (1013 observations) 
Actual DCP 1.094 5.311 
Hypothetical DCP if the other 
type of security issued 
3.540 1.937 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
-2.447a 
(-110.14) 
3.374a
(74.97) 
Difference in dollars if mean 
PAMT raised 
-$4.968 million $4.133 million 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 15 
Event study results 
 
CAR(-1,+1) is three-day cumulative abnormal returns. Day 0 is the security offerings date.  
 
Panel A. Comparisons of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) among different event windows and 
between straight debt issues and common stock issues 
Event window 1533 Straight debt issues 
(T-test: mean CAR=0) 
1012 Common stock 
issues 
(T-test: mean CAR=0) 
CAR difference 
(T-stat: CAR 
difference=0) 
CAR(-1,+1) 0.034       (0.394) -1.759a        (-8.04) 1.793a        (7.62) 
CAR(-1,0) -0.005       (-0.068) -1.708a        (-9.35) 1.703a        (8.70) 
CAR(0,0), -0.003       (-0.057) -0.735a        (-5.65) 0.732a        (5.23) 
CAR(0,1) 0.036       (0.496) -0.786a        (4.33) 0.822a        (4.24) 
 
Panel B. Comparisons of CAR(-1,+1) between firms followed by analysts, and firms not followed by 
analysts 
 Straight debt (obs) Equity (obs) 
Firms with analyst coverage  0.106 (2492) 2.145 (1806) 
Firms without analyst 
coverage  
-0.361 (80) -5.341 (300) 
Mean difference 
(t-stat:differencde=0) 
0.467 (0.788) 3.196a (4.777) 
Mean of Total  0.091 (2572) -2.600 (2106) 
 
Panel C. Comparisons of CAR(-1,+1) among analyst coverage quintiles and between straight debt 
issues and common stock issues 
Analyst coverage 
quintiles 
Straight debt issues 
(T-test: mean CAR=0) 
Common stock issues 
(T-test: mean CAR= 0) 
Mean difference: D-E 
(t-stat, Ha: difference>0) 
Quintile 1 (low) 0.549      (1.475) -2.320a    (-5.345) 2.869a     (5.016) 
Quintile 2 0.055      (0.190) -1.523a    (-3.952) 1.578a     (3.279) 
Quintile 3 0.284      (1.293) -1.601a    (-4.038) 1.885a     (4.159) 
Quintile 4 -0.219      (-1.453) -0.962c    (-1.913) 0.743c     (1.415) 
Quintile 5 (high) -0.083      (-0.706) -1.207b    (-2.172) 1.124b    (1.997) 
Mean (Q1-Q5) 
(t-stat, Ha: Q1-Q5<0) 
0.633 
(1.619) 
-1.113c
(-1.578) 
------- 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 16 
Results on three-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-1,+1) 
 
IMR is inverse mills ratio obtained through Heckman’s two-step procedure by running Probit model (4) in 
Table 12 first. LNANN is natural logarithm of (ANN+1), where ANN is the 12-month average analyst 
coverage before security-offering month. LNPRDS is natural logarithm of total proceeds raised, PRDS. 
MBKR is market-to-book value ratio. CFLTA is the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is 
return on assets. RISZFY is relative issue size. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return, 
calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] period minus the NYSE-AMEX-
NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the residual 
returns of the market model which regresses a firm’s daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-
weighted return over [-255, -46] period. ∆ in Coeff  is the change in coefficient. # OBS is the number of 
observations. The values in the parentheses are t-statistic values.  
 
Panel A. OLS regressions with CAR(-1,+1) as the dependent variable 
 Straight debt Equity 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS OLS ∆ in Coeff OLS OLS ∆ in Coeff 
LNAAN -0.139 
(-0.77) 
-0.152 
(-0.67) 
-9.35% 0.272 
(0.64) 
0.364    
(0.87) 
33.82% 
LNPRDS 0.110    
(0.87) 
0.103    
(0.68) 
-6.36% 0.166    
(0.65) 
0.382     
(1.27) 
130.12% 
MBKR -0.104 
(-0.67) 
-0.010 
(-0.62) 
90.38% 0.122 
(0.99) 
0.050    
(0.39) 
-59.02% 
CFLTA -2.592 
(-0.83) 
-2.660 
(-0.81) 
-2.62% -1.297 
(-0.38) 
-1.974 
(-0.57) 
-52.20% 
ROA 0.730 
(0.26) 
0.656   
(0.23) 
-10.14% 3.946   
(1.11) 
4.791   
(1.32) 
21.41% 
RISZFY 0.038    
(0.10) 
0.038    
(0.10) 
0.00% 0.430    
(0.24) 
-0.064 
(-0.04) 
-114.88% 
ABCUMRET -0.833b
(-2.40) 
-0.817b
(-2.16) 
1.92% -0.478 
(-1.30) 
-0.562 
(-1.47) 
-17.57% 
RESIDSD 0.254 
(1.43) 
0.264 
(1.43) 
3.94% -0.490b 
(-2.25) 
-0.626a
(-2.76) 
-27.76% 
IMR  0.034     
(0.12) 
  -1.193b
(-2.10) 
 
CONSTANT -0.345 
(-0.45) 
-0.345 
(-0.45) 
 -1.693     
(-1.30) 
-1.444 
(-1.14) 
 
R-square 0.016 0.016  0.034 0.038  
# OBS 1532 1532  1013 1013  
 
Panel B. Comparisons among mean actual CAR(-1,+1), and hypothetical CAR(-1,+1) if a firm issued 
the alternative security type instead 
 Straight debt Equity 
Actual CAR(-1,+1)  0.034 -1.759 
Hypothetical CAR if the other 
type of security issued 
-0.990 -0.012 
Difference  
(T-stat) 
   1.024a 
(11.51 ) 
-1.748a
(-7.99) 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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Table 17 
Results on indirect offering costs, INDCP 
 
LNANN is natural logarithm of (ANN+1), where ANN is the 12-month average analyst coverage before 
security-offering month. LNPRDS is natural logarithm of total proceeds raised, PRDS. MBKR is market-
to-book value ratio. CFLTA is the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets. 
RISZFY is relative issue size. ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return. RESIDSD is the 
standard deviation of the residual returns of the market model which regresses a firm’s daily return on the 
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. ∆ in Coeff  is the change in 
coefficient.  # obs is the number of observations. The values in the parentheses are t-statistic values. 
 
Panel A. OLS regressions with robust standard errors. INDCP is the dependent variable 
 Straight debt Equity 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS OLS ∆ in Coeff OLS OLS ∆ in Coeff 
LNAAN 7.305b 
(1.97) 
2.209 
(0.63) 
74.24% 1.145 
(0.29) 
0.259   
(0.07) 
-73.38% 
LNPRDS -8.290b
(-2.00) 
-11.789b     
(-2.39) 
40.97% -2.799    
(-1.02) 
-5.113c
(-1.65) 
-82.67% 
MBKR 8.630 
(1.49) 
10.730c
(1.77) 
-20.95% -0.210 
(-0.15) 
0.577 
(0.39) 
374.76% 
CFLTA 73.452 
(1.07) 
86.105 
(1.25) 
-14.04% -18.352 
(-0.48) 
-11.082 
(-0.29) 
39.61% 
ROA -43.382 
(-0.71) 
-74.370 
(-1.12) 
61.74% -9.362 
(-0.25) 
18.580 
(-0.48) 
298.46% 
RISZFY 5.297 
(1.57) 
5.240 
(1.51) 
-1.33% -26.656b   
(-2.38) 
-21.309b
(-2.04) 
20.06% 
ABCUMRET 9.059 
(1.62) 
15.795b
(2.31) 
-73.97% 6.631c 
(1.84) 
7.548b 
(2.00) 
13.83% 
RESIDSD -1.567 
(-0.56) 
2.500 
(0.70) 
-157.03% 3.386
(1.60) 
4.846b
(2.22) 
43.12% 
IMR  13.751c 
(1.67) 
  12.825b
(2.19) 
 
CONSTANT 15.478 
(0.75) 
15.516 
(0.76) 
 17.979     
(1.38) 
15.651 
(1.16) 
 
R-square 0.014 0.017  0.040 0.044  
# OBS 1532 1532  1013 1013  
 
Panel B. Comparisons among mean actual INDCP, and hypothetical INDCP if a firm issued the 
alternative security type instead 
 Straight debt Equity 
Actual INDCP 4.450 15.682 
Hypothetical INDCP if the other 
type of security issued (2) 
14.312 19.262 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
-9.771a
(-4.49) 
3.580c
(1.65) 
Difference in dollars if mean 
PRDS raised 
-$19.654 million $3.956 million 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Table 18 
Comparison of total offerings costs 
TCP is total offering costs, which is the sum of direct offering costs and indirect offering costs. The 
hypothetical TCP are the sum of hypothetical direct offering costs and the hypothetical indirect offering 
costs. 
 Straight debt (1532 observations) Equity (1013 observations) 
Actual TCP 5.634 20.993 
Hypothetical TCP if the other 
type of security issued 
17.852 21.199 
Difference 
(T-stat) 
-12.218a
(-5.79) 
-0.206 
(-0.095) 
Difference in dollars if mean 
PAMT raised 
-$24.575 million $0.228 million 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Appendix A  
Reexamine Firm quality and information production via different sample 
classifications 
 
The whole sample firms are first classified into debt and equity groups, then firms within each financing 
group are further divided into quartiles based on firm quality measures. Firm quality is measured by 
ABCUMRET, MBKR, and ROA. Information production is measured by ANNCH. ABCUMRET is pre-
issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] 
period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. MBKR is Market-
to-book ratio, calculated as market value at prior fiscal year end plus book value of total assets minus book 
value of equity, then divided by the book value of assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by book value of total assets. Change in 
analyst coverage is calculated as the post-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage minus the pre-issue 12-
month mean analyst coverage. 
 
Panel A: Pre-issue cumulative abnormal return and change in analyst coverage 
ABCUMRET quartiles 
 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (low) -0.2202  (458) 0.8481    (344) 
Quartile 2  0.1365   (458) 1.4934    (344) 
Quartile 3  0.1884   (458) 1.5714    (344) 
Quartile 4 (High)  0.4158   (457) 1.8259    (343) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
              Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.6360a 
(-3.699) 
-0.9777a 
(-6.298) 
 
Panel B. Issuers’ market-to-book ratio and change in analyst coverage 
MBKR quartiles Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (Low) -0.0624  (458) 1.0165   (344) 
Quartile 2 0.1756  (458) 1.3365   (344) 
Quartile 3 0.1337   (458) 1.5178   (344) 
Quartile 4 (High) 0.2733 (457) 1.8683   (343) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
              Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.3357b 
(-1.894) 
-0.8518a
(-5.116) 
 
Panel C. Issuers’ profitability and change in analyst coverage 
ROA quartiles 
 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (low) 0.1661  (458) 1.1841   (344) 
Quartile 2 0.0237  (458) 1.4417    (344) 
Quartile 3 0.1472   (458) 1.3425   (344) 
Quartile 4 (high) 0.1830  (457) 1.7704   (343) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
              Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.0169 
(-0.010) 
-0.5863a 
(-3.783) 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Appendix B 
Reexamine information asymmetry and information production via different 
sample classifications 
 
The whole sample firms are first classified into debt and equity groups, then firms within each financing 
group are further divided into quartiles based on information asymmetry measures. Information asymmetry 
is measured by INVANN and ASYIND. Information production is measured by ANNCH. INVANN is 
inverse analyst coverage, the reciprocal of the pre-issue 12-month average analyst coverage. ANNCH is the 
change in analyst coverage, calculated as the post-issue 12-month mean analyst coverage minus the pre-
issue 12-month mean analyst coverage (ANN). ASYIND is information asymmetry index using the 
following equation based on Butler, Grullon and Weston (2004): 
  
( )ikK
k
k XRankKN
ASYIND ∑
=
=
1
11
 
Where Xik is the kth variables used as information asymmetry measures, which include -ANN, -LNTA, -
TURNOVER, XRDTA, MBKR and RESIDSD. LNTA is natural logarithm of book value of total assets.  
TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading turnover over [-252, -1] period. Daily trading turnover the 
daily trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in 
research & development to book value of total assets. I assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is 
missing in COMPUSTAT. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value at prior fiscal year 
end plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, then divided by the book value of assets. 
RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the residual returns of the market model, which regresses a firm’s 
daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. 
 
Panel A. Inverse analyst coverage and information production 
Inverse Analyst coverage  
Quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (Low) -0.4879  (461) 1.0574   (344) 
Quartile 2 -0.0606  (465) 1.5933   (347) 
Quartile 3  0.2924  (449) 1.4829   (343) 
Quartile 4 (high)  0.7891  (455) 1.6043   (341) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-1.277a
(-7.950) 
-0.5469a
(-3.456) 
 
Panel B. Information asymmetry index and information production 
Information asymmetry index 
quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (low) -0.1938  (458) 1.1844   (344) 
Quartile 2  0.1009   (458) 1.4381   (344) 
Quartile 3  0.3402   (458) 1.7660   (344) 
Quartile 4 (high)  0.2728   (457) 1.3490   (343) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥  0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-0.4666a 
(-2.921) 
-0.1646
(-1.146) 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Appendix C 
Information production and financing choices, two-step procedure results 
 
LNTA is logarithm of book value of total assets. INVANN is the reciprocal of ANN, the pre-issue 12-
month average analyst coverage. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio. FIXTA is fixed assets to total assets ratio. 
TXTTA is the ratio of tax payments to the book value of total assets. XRDTA is the ratio of expenditure in 
research & development to book value of total assets. We assume a firm’s R&D expenditure is zero if it is 
missing in COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets. CFLTA is 
the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets. ABCUMRET is pre-issue 
abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily returns over [-252, -30] 
period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same period. BETA is the beta 
coefficient of the market return in the market model, obtained by regressing a firm’s daily return on the 
NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. RESIDSD is the standard 
deviation of the residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average daily stock trading 
turnover over [-252, -1] period. # obs is the number of observations. The dependent variable is EDDUM, 
which equals 1 if primary equity is issued, otherwise equals 0 if straight debt is issued.  
 
Panel A. Step 1: construction of predicted change in analyst coverage 
The dependent variable is change in analyst coverage. 
Independent variable Coefficient t P >|t| 
ANN -0.0646a -8.28 0.000 
MBKR 0.0913a 2.85 0.004 
ROA 1.1142a 5.26 0.000 
LNTA -0.0718c -1.85 0.065 
ABCUMRET 0.1672a 4.98 0.000 
RESIDSD -0.0437 -1.04 0.298 
CONSTANT 1.7012a 5.74 0.000 
# OBS 3206 
R2 0.1079 
 
Panel B. Comparing predicted change in analyst coverage between debt and equity offerings 
PCHAN is predicted change in analyst coverage, the predicted value the OLS model is Panel A. 
Predicted change in 
analyst 
Straight debt 
(1532 observations) 
Equity 
(1013 observations) 
Test H0: Difference=0 
            Ha: Difference≠0 
Mean 0.2885 1.2233 t-statistic: -40.516a
Median 0.3339 1.2331 z-statistic: -35.051a
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 Appendix C (continued) 
 
Panel C. Step 2: Expected information production on equity/debt choices 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 
PCHANN 0.2666b -0.4689b
INVANN -4.9240a  
PCHANN*INVANN 2.7192a  
ASYIND  -1.1113 
PCHANN*ASYIND  1.4405a
MBKR 0.1411a 0.1739a
LNTA -0.4768a -0.4913a
FIXTA 0.3745b 0.3872b
TXTTA -3.7487b -3.9178b
XRDTA 3.7352a 3.4079a
LTDTA -0.0850 -0.1815 
CFLTA 0.9047 0.7671 
ROA -4.7516a -3.6518a
ABCUMRET 0.6826a 0.7845a
BETA -0.0765 -0.0375 
RESIDSD 0.2332a 0.1446a
TURNOVER 0.3117c 0.4457a
CONSTANT 2.6550a 2.8276a
Pseudo R2 0.5685 0.5634 
# OBS 3206 3206 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Appendix D 
Reexamine change in analyst coverage and post-issue stock market performance via 
different sample classifications 
 
The whole sample firms are first classified into debt and equity groups, then firms within each financing 
group are further divided into quartiles based on change in analyst coverage Change in analyst coverage is 
the difference between the 12-month average analyst coverage after security offerings and the 12-month 
average analyst coverage before security offerings. The post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal return is 
calculated according to the following equation: 
( ) ( ) 100*]11[
22
∏∏
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t
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t
jtjt RRabcumretny  
Where n=1, 2 or 3, τ=252 if n=1, τ=504 if n=2, and τ=756 if n=3. Rjt is firm j’s daily return since the 
second day of security offerings. RMt is the market’s daily return, which is measured by the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index return. 
 
Panel A. Change in analyst coverage and post-issue one-year abnormal return 
Change in Analyst coverage 
quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (low) -1.6699  (437) -10.3018a   (306) 
Quartile 2 -8.0689a  (426)  -9.8301a   (328) 
Quartile 3 -1.0999    (426) -10.5978a   (324) 
Quartile 4 (high)  2.3351    (444)  20.8304b   (320) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
-4.0050b 
(-1.6619) 
-31.1322a 
(-3.2156) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q2-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q2-Q4 < 0) 
-10.4040a 
(-4.2951) 
-30.6606a 
(-3.1526) 
 
Panel B. Change in analyst coverage and post-issue two-year abnormal return 
Change in Analyst coverage 
quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (low) -1.7681   (373) -25.3936a   (261) 
Quartile 2 -13.1615a  (380) -22.6730a  (298) 
Quartile 3  -5.0522c  (396) -28.9909a  (279) 
Quartile 4 (high) -3.1363  (405) -2.3073    (274) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
1.3682
(0.3448) 
-23.0864a 
(-2.4954) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q2-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q2-Q4 < 0) 
-10.0252a 
(-2.5239) 
-20.3658b 
(-2.1311) 
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 Appendix D (continued) 
 
Panel C. Change in analyst coverage and post-issue three-year abnormal return 
Change in Analyst coverage 
quartiles 
Straight Debt 
(# observation ) 
Equity 
(# observation ) 
Quartile 1 (low) -4.1682   (330) -38.4364a (218) 
Quartile 2 -17.2955a  (350) -37.7807a (265) 
Quartile 3 -13.0370a  (362) -33.8992a (233) 
Quartile 4 (high)  -7.0790c    (374) -10.9968 (220) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q1-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q1-Q4 < 0) 
2.9108 
(-0.4865) 
-27.4396b 
(-1.7460) 
Mean difference 
(T-stat, H0: Q2-Q4 ≥ 0 
            Ha: Q2-Q4 < 0) 
-10.2165b 
(-1.7337) 
-26.7839b 
(-1.6984) 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
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 Appendix E 
Construction of PCHANN 
 
PCHANN is the predicted value of the following OLS model: 
RESIDSDABCUMRETLNTAROAMBKRANNEHATANNCH 76543210 αααααααα +++++++=
Where EHAT is the predicted value of the following probit model: 
TURNOVERRESIDSDBETAABCUMRETROACFLOWTA
LTDTAXRDTATXTTAFIXTALNTAMBKReddumob
121110987
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PCHANN is predicted change in analyst coverage. It is used to measure expected information production 
due to security offerings. LNTA is logarithm of book value of total assets. INVANN is the reciprocal of 
ANN, the pre-issue 12-month average analyst coverage. MBKR is Market-to-book ratio. FIXTA is fixed 
assets to total assets ratio. TXTTA is the ratio of tax payments to the book value of total assets. XRDTA is 
the ratio of expenditure in research & development to book value of total assets. We assume a firm’s R&D 
expenditure is zero if it is missing in COMPUSTAT. LTDTA is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of 
total assets. CFLTA is the ratio of cash flow to book value of total assets. ROA is return on assets. 
ABCUMRET is pre-issue abnormal cumulative return, calculated as a firm’s pre-issue cumulative daily 
returns over [-252, -30] period minus the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over the same 
period. BETA is the beta coefficient of the market return in the market model, obtained by regressing a 
firm’s daily return on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted return over [-255, -46] period. 
RESIDSD is the standard deviation of the residual returns of the market model. TURNOVER is the average 
daily stock trading turnover over [-252, -1] period. # obs is the number of observations. The dependent 
variable is EDDUM, which equals 1 if primary equity is issued, otherwise equals 0 if straight debt is issued.  
 
Panel A: probit regression with robust errors 
Independent variable Coefficient Z-stat P > |Z| 
MBKR 0.197a 3.93 0.000 
LNTA -0.494a -15.99 0.000 
FIXTA 0.344b 2.14 0.032 
TXTAT -4.206b -2.41 0.016 
XRDTA 3.098a 2.87 0.004 
LTDTA -0.086 -0.39 0.704 
CFLOWTA 1.068 1.18 0.241 
ROA -3.747a -4.31 0.000 
ABCUMRET 0.880a 7.56 0.000 
BETA -0.043 -0.56 0.562 
RESIDSD 0.170a 3.61 0.000 
TURNOVER 0.441a 3.74 0.000 
CONSTANT 2.457a 8.52 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.4828 
# Observation 2545 
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 Appendix E (continued) 
 
Panel B: OLS regression with robust errors 
Independent variable Coefficient t-stat P > |t| 
EHAT 1.858a 5.71 0.000 
ANN -0.067a -8.17 0.000 
MBKR 0.239a 5.81 0.000 
LNTA 0.187a 2.71 0.007 
RESIDSD -0.199a -3.64 0.000 
ROA 2.172a 5.33 0.000 
ABCUMRET 0.105a 1.67 0.095 
CONSTANT -0.735 -1.27 0.206 
R2 0.1296 
# Observation 2545 
a indicates significance at 1%, b indicates significance at 5%, c indicates significance at 10%. 
 124
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About the Author 
Bingsheng Yi received a Bachelor’s Degree in Management Engineering in 1993 
and a M.S. in Economics in 1996. Both degrees were from Beijing Materials College. 
After getting his master degree, Mr. Yi worked one year as a full time college instructor. 
Thereafter he spent two years in the Ph.D. program in Economics at University of 
Ottawa, finishing all courses and passing the comprehensive exams. In August 1999 Mr. 
Yi entered the Ph.D. program in Finance at the University of South Florida. 
While in the Ph.D. program at the University of South Florida, Mr.Yi passed all 
three-level examinations in the Chartered Financial Analyst Program and received the 
CFA designation in 2004. He has also coauthored two publications in Global Business 
and Finance Review and made several paper presentations at Financial Management 
Association Annual Meetings and the 11th Conference of Global Finance Association. 
  
